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Wagner: Environmental Expropriation

ARTICLE
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, EXPROPRIATION
AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
By J_ MARTIN WAGNER·

Government could hardly go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every ___ change in the general law ___ _
[Slome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power_
-Oliver Wendell Holmes 1
1.

INTRODUCTION

International law has long protected foreign property from
expropriation-confiscation by the host-coWltry governmentby giving the owner of the property a right to compensation for
the value of the lost property_ In recent decades, foreign property owners have made claims for compensation based on governmental regulations, such as placing restrictions on the legal
use of property, that do not actually remove the owner's title to

* J. Martin Wagner is the Director of International Legal Programs for Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund and an Adjunct Professor at Golden Gate University School of
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and assistance provided by David Wirth, Linda Nowlan and Carlos Baumgarten, and the research assistance of Stephanie Tai and Scott Smithline.
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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the property, but nevertheless substantially affect its value. As
this doctrine of "indirect expropriation" has developed, international tribunals and legal scholars have cautioned that the obligation to compensate does not extend to regulations imposed
pursuant to the exercise of legitimate government police powers, such as taxation and protection of human health and welfare. To require otherwise would, as Oliver Wendell HoInles
noted, severely limit the ability of governments to promote the
general welfare.
In recent decades, the harmful effect of human activities on
the environment and the connection between environmental
health and human well-being have become obvious. Recognizing these relationships makes clear the need for governmental
restrictions on environmentally harmful activities. In addition,
a key tenet of environmental protection is that those responsible for harming the environment should bear the cost of protecting it. In this light, one might imagine that environmental
regulations would be safe from claims that their economic impact on private property constitutes indirect expropriation and
thus gives property owners a right to compensation. In the
past few years, however, several cases have challenged that
assumption.

Like many other international agreements, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) requires compensation for direct or indirect expropriation of foreign investment.
In an unprecedented move, companies have begun to use this
protection to challenge measures promoted by governments as
necessary to protect the environment and human health. A
U.S. company running a hazardous waste disposal facility in
Mexico is seeking $90 million in compensation from Mexico for
losses incurred when the local government refused to permit
operation of the plant because of its discovery that the local
geology made it likely that the waste treated at the plant would
contaminate local water supplies. Another U.s. toxic waste
disposal company has claimed that Canada should pay it at
least $10 million for losses arising out of a 15-month Canadian
ban on the export of a particularly volatile hazardous waste.
Canada asserted that the ban was necessary to ensure that the.
waste would be treated safely, preventing contamination in
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Canada and the United States that might arise if treatment
was inadequate. In the most publicized case, a U.S. manufacturer of a gasoline additive settled a compensation claim
against Canada, obtaining a payment of $19 million (it had
sought $250 million) and convincing Canada to rescind a ban
on the importation of the additive. Although Canada had initially promoted the ban as necessary to avoid risks that the
additive posed to the environment and human health, part of
the settlement included a statement by the Canadian government that it did not have "sufficient evidence" on which to base
a "clear case" that the additive was causing the asserted harm.
As these NAFTA cases make clear, giving companies the
right to base compensation claims on the economic impact of
environmental regulations has a serious chilling effect on the
ability and willingness of governments to implement such
regulations. Governments that do so risk being penalized by
having to divert precious governmental resources to defend the
regulations against expropriation claims and to pay compensation payments if the defense is unsuccessful. Moreover, as the
Canadian gasoline additive case suggests, such penalties may
be great enough that a government may not be able to maintain a regulation it has deemed necessary. To make matters
worse, the provisions on which these claims have been based
are the model for efforts to expand investment protection regionally, in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA),
and globally, in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAl) or an equivalent global agreement.

Despite the claims that have been brought under NAFTA,
and the one settlement reached, none of the cases has yet been
resolved by a tribunal. Moreover, the companies making the
claims have objected that the regulations have not really been
environmentally motivated. It thus remains uncertain the extent to which the NAFTA investment protections apply to environmental regulations.
The Canadian government has expressed the desire to draft
an interpretive "rider" to Chapter 11 to clarify and limit the
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investor-state provisions. 2 The Canadian trade minister has
suggested that the United States and Mexico support this effort3 and the ministers have apparently agreed to "focus attention" on the issue at an April 1999 meeting in Ottawa. 4 Canada has proposed making nations' domestic laws on expropriation the standard for international panels to use in investorstate challenges. 5 An attorney who has represented U.S. companies in three NAFTA investment challenges against Canada
has objected that Canada's position would result in "a defmition of expropriation that's less than the internationally accepted defmition of expropriation. "6 However, as this Article
demonstrates, international law does not require governments
to provide compensation for the economic impact of most legitimate environmental laws or regulations. Such freedom to
regulate is necessary if governments are to be able to protect
the environment.
NAFTA does not clearly defme the actions covered by its
expropriation provisions. Interpretation of the provisions will
thus depend in part on international law and the domestic traditions of the negotiating parties. This Article argues that both
international and U.S. law preserve the right of governments
to regulate to protect the environment without having to compensate for the impact of such regulations on investment. Mter a brief description of the relationship between foreign investment and the environmentin Part II, the Article will describe the protection against expropriation provided by international agreements, briefly discussing bilateral investment
agreements and then detailing the protection provided by
NAFTA and the MAl in Part III. Part IV will then describe the
challenges to environmental laws that have been brought un-

2. Greenwire, Feb. 23, 1999, at 22 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Feb. 23, 1999).
3. See AMERICASTRADE, Dec. 24, 1998, at 22·23. According to the Canadian trade
minister, both the United States and Mexico supported Canada's efforts to narrow the
interpretation of expropriation in the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl) at
an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (DECD) meeting. [d.
4. Greenwire, Feb. 23, 1999, at 22 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Feb. 23, 1999).
5. See AMERICASTRADE, Mar. 11, 1999, at 1. Such a clarification would "state that
no party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment in a manner that would be inconsistent with its own principles of domestic law." [d. at 11.
6. Barry Appleton, quoted in id. at 12.
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der NAFTA's investment chapter. Next, Part V will examine
the treatment of indirect expropriation under U.S. and internationallaw. Part VI will demonstrate that, under NAFTA and
international expropriation and environmental law, environmental measures should not normally give rise to a right to
compensation. Finally, the Article will conclude with some
proposals for ensuring that NAFTA, and other investment
agreements, do not interfere with the ability of governments to
take action to protect the environment.
II.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT

The global influence of foreign private capital has increased
substantially in recent years. For example, from 1990 to 1996,
the amount of private capital flowing to developing countries
increased over tenfold, from US $22 billion to US $244 billion. 7
The increased flow of private capital directly affects environmental protection. Governments compete to attract this
capital, in large part by changing regulations affecting foreign
investments.8 One economist studying this phenomenon with
respect to environmental regulations has concluded that
a concern to be attractive to foreign investors in a highly
competitive global economy has kept a lid on 10caVnational [environmental] standards or enforcement
of standards. While there has not been a universal
"race to the bottom," increased globalization [of foreign
investment) ... has inhibited a "race to the top" and
caused environmental commitments to be "stuck in the
mud.''9

7. See Gretta Goldenman, The Environmental Implications of Foreign Direct Investment: Policy and Institutional Issues 2 (OECD Conf. on FDI and the Env't, Jan. 29,
1999), OECD Doc. CCNMIEMEFIEPOC/CIME(98)3 <http://www.oecd:org/daf/env> (on
file with the author).
8. See id. at 2, 4 (citing 1997 UNCTAD study indicating that 90% of changes in
laws governing foreign direct investment ·were aimed at creating a more favourable
climate for [investment)").
9. Lyuba Zarsky, Havens, Halos and Spaghetti: Untangling the Evidence About
Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment (OECD Conference on Foreign Direct
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As a result of the conflict between the desire to attract investment and strong environmental protection, greater opening
of markets to foreign direct investment "may lead to patterns of
investment and production that are not desirable in that market conditions do not adequately allow for the internalization of
social (including environmental) costs. "10 Internalizing environmental costs - meaning shifting the cost of environmental
harm from society at large to the person causing the harm - is
a fundamental element of environmental protection. 11 This
principle, called the "polluter pays principle," was recognized
internationally in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:

National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach
that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of
pollution. 12

Investment and the Enviornment, Jan. 29, 1999) OECD Doc. CCNMlEMEF/
EPOC/CIME(98)5 at 3. Zarsky concluded that, with respect to the environmental effects of investment, "regulation matters." Id. at 20.
10. J(Hans) B. Opschoor, Multilateral AgreeTTU!nts on InvestTTU!nt and the EnvironTTU!nt 9 (OECD Conf. on FDI and the Env't, Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.
oecd.org/daf/env> (on file with author).
11. The polluter pays principle began as an economic principle formulated in the
1970s by the OECD. The OECD agreed that
.
Itlhe principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmental resources and
to avoid distortions in international trade and investment is the so-called
"Polluter-Pays Principle." This principle means that the polluter should bear
the expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state. In other
words, the cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and
services which cause pollution in production and/or consumption. Such measures should not be accompanied by subsidies that would create significlmt distortions in international trade and investment.
Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of
Environmental Policies, OECD, C(72)128 (1972) (hereinafter "OECD Guiding Principles").
12. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), princ. 16,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879 (hereinafter "Rio Declaration"). The principle, which
has been called "a general principle of international environmental law," International
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990,
pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 733, 736, has been adopted in numerous other international agreements. See, e.g., 1986 Single European Act, June 29, 1987, 1987 O.J. (L 169) art.
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The decision to internalize the cost of pollution or other harm
to the environment, rather than requiring society in general to
bear that cost, goes to the very heart of the question of indirect
expropriation. The United States Supreme Court has explained
that the determination that the government must pay compensation for the impact of its action on property "is, in essence, a
determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in
the public interest. "13 Thus, requiring the government to provide compensation for the impact of environmental laws or
regulations on property - i.e., determining that "the public at
large" must bear the burden of that regulation - is directly at
odds with the polluter pays principle.
While this brief discussion clearly suggests that environmental laws and regulations should not give rise to a governmental obligation to compensate in any but the most extreme
situations, some foreign investors have taken a different view.
The resolution of this question is thus of great significance to
both investors and governments:
[T]o the investor, the line of demarcation between
measures for which no compensation is due and actions
qualifying as indirect expropriations [that require compensation] may well make the difference between the
burden to operate (or abandon) a non-profitable enterprise and the right to receive full compensation (either
from the host State or under an insurance contract).
For the host State, the definition determines the scope
of the State's power to enact legislation that regulates
the rights and obligations of owners in instances where
compensation may fall due. It may be argued that the

130r(2), as amended by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (Lf224/l),
reprinted in 31I.L.M. 247; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment in
the Northeast Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, art. 2(2)(b) <http://sedac.ciesin.org/
pidpltextslacrclMEofNE.txt.html> (on file with author); Convention for the Protect of
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea, Apr. 9, 1992, art. 3(4) <http://
www.helcom.filconven92.html> (on me with author); Helsinki Convention on the Pro·
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, March 17,
1992, art. 2(5), 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316.
13. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1995).
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State is prevented from taking any such measures
where these cannot be covered by public fInancial resources. 14
III.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

Nations have codifIed protection against expropriation in
various forms of international agreements. Although the most
common source of such protection are bilateral investment
agreements, nations have begun to include expropriation provisions in multilateral agreements. It is in the context of these
agreements that the international community will determine
whether environmental regulations may constitute a compensable expropriation.
A.

BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

In recent decades, nations have signillcantly increased their
. use of bilateral agreements to protect foreign investment from
expropriation. In 1990, there were 435 bilateral investment
agreements (BITs); by March 1998, that number had iincreased
to 1300. 15 In addition to providing protection for U.S. investments abroad, the United States sees its BITs as having a "significant impact" on the worldwide adoption of U.S. policies on
the treatment of foreign investment in countries undergoing
economic reform, and laying "the policy groundwork for broader
multilateral initiatives in the [OEeD] and eventually, the
[WTO]."16

14. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 99·
100 (1995).
15. See Alan Larson, Asst. U.S. Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Ag·
riculutral Affairs, Testimony before the House International &glations Committee,
Subcommittee on Int'l Econ. Pol) and Trade, Mar. 6, 1998, (visited Jan. 26, 1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1998/980306_larson_mai.htm> (on me with
author) [hereinafter Larson Testimony]. Between the mid·1980s and March 1998, the
United States had negotiated 41 BITs. Id.
16. US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S. BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY PROGRAM (Apr. 16. 1997) [hereinafter FACT SHEETl.
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Nearly all BITs provide protection against expropriation. 17
The majority also cover indirect expropriation,18 using phrases
such as "having effect equivalent to ... expropriation," "any direct or indirect measure" of expropriation, "any other measure
having the same nature or the same effect against investments," or "all other measures whose effect is to dispossess,
directly or indirectly, the investors."19 BITs to which the
United States is party generally provide protection against
"expropriation or nationalization (directly or indirectly through
measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization)."2O
According to a study by the Investment Group of the Negotiators of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, "[i]n all
cases, the language [of BITs] is broad and allows for coverage of
so-called 'creeping' or 'indirect' expropriations, that is, measures having the same effect to expropriation. "21
Because BITs seldom define expropriation in any detail, the
general rules of international law should inform the interpretation of this term. 22 Considering expropriation as included in
U.S. BITs, one scholar has stated: "Consistent with article X,
paragraph 1 of the U.S. Model BIT, principles of international
law, and law under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, measures taken by competent authorities of either party

17. See DOLER& STEVENS, supra note 14, at 98. BITs may use different words to
describe the concept of expropriation, such as "dispossession," "taking," "deprivation" or
"privation." ld.
18. See id. at 97,99.
19. ld. at 100·01.
20. FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE WESTERN
HEMISPHERE: A COMPENDIUM at 19. See also DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 14, at
102 (citing 1992 U.S. model treaty, art. III).
21. FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 20, at 19.
22. The United States considers that its BITs provide protection against expropriation"in accordance with international law standards." FACT SHEET, supra note 16.
A few US BITs have elaborated on the meaning of expropriation, stating that it includes "the levying of taxation, the compulsory sale of all or part of an investment, or
the impairment or deprivation of its management, control or economic value." DOLZER
& STEVENS, supra note 14, at 102 (quoting U.S.-Zaire BIT (1984), art. III). See also
FTAA INVESTMENT GROUP, supra note 20, at 19 (quoting US-Haiti BIT). Professors
. Dolzer and Stevens have noted that such an elaboration "represents possibly the
broadest scope in investment treaties with respect to indirect expropriation insofar as
the inclusion of measures that cause the 'impairment ... of [thel economic value' of an
investment equates expropriation with a host of measures which might not otherwise
be considered as such under general international law, let alone under liberal systems
of domestic law." DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 102.
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in the legitimate, nondiscriminatory exercise of its police
power, which reduce an investment value, do not constitute
expropriation within the meaning of article III [of the Model
BIT]."23
B.

NAFTA

The international community has come to believe that using
BITs to protect investment is "non-transparent and potentially
inefficient," leading to a shift in favor of a multilateral approach to investment protection. 24 Consistent with this approach, Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) regulates the treatment by Parties of foreign
investors and foreign investments. 25
The NAFTA investment chapter establishes two kinds of
requirements with respect to foreign investment. First, each
country must treat foreign investors or their investments as
well as or better than it treats any other investments in that
country. Thus, foreign investors and investments must receive
the better of6 (a) the treatment provided to a country's own
investors or investments in like circumstances (national treatment)27 and (b) the best treatment provided to the investors or
investments of any other nation, whether or not it i'3 a party
(most-favored-nation treatment).28 Second, the Agreement
prohibits governments from imposing certain requirements on
foreign investments. One such provision prohibits celtain per23.

Pamela B. Gann, The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, 21 STAN. J.

INT'L L. 373, 399 n. 120 (1985).

24. -See Opschoor, supra note 10.
25. North American Free Trade Agreement, December 8 and 17, 1992, Chapter 11,
32 I.L.M. 638 (1993). The Agreement's defmition of "investment" is extremely broad,
including an "enterprise"; securities, loans to, or interest in the assets or profits of an
enterprise; tangible or intangible real estate or other property aCquired for economic
benefit; and interests from the commitment of capital or other resources to economic
activities. See id. art. 1139.
26. See id. art. 1104 (requiring parties to provide "the better of the treatment required by Articles 1102 and 1103").
27. See id. art. 1102. States or provinces of a nation must accord treatment at
least as favorable as provided to any investor or investment of the country. of which
they are a part. See id. art. 1102(3).
28. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1103. The national and most-favored-nation
treatment requirements apply to the "establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." Id.
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formance requirements, such as requiring foreign investors to
supply products or services to a specific regional or world market, to export a specified volume of their products or services, to
use a certain amount of domestic components, or to transfer
technology to an entity in the country's territory.29 Other provisions prohibit imposing nationality requirements on senior
managers of an enterprise 30 or placing restrictions on transfers
relating to investments, including payments made pursuant to
arbitration under the investment provisions. 31
Article 1110 protects against the "expropriation" of foreign
investments:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party
in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except: ,
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article
1105(1);(32] and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with
[subsequent paragraphs specifying valuation of expropriations and form and procedure ofpayment].33
When a foreign investor believes that a government has expropriated its investment, Chapter 11 gives the investor a direct right to force the government of the country in which the
investment is located into binding arbitration to resolve the
29. See id. art. 1106.
30. See id. art. 1107(1).
31. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1109. Such transfers also include profits, dividends, fees and payments, and proceeds of sales. See id.
32. Article 1105(1) provides: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors
of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security."
33. [d. art. 1110.
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claim. 34 The investor may submit its claim under one of three
sets of rules for resolving international investment disputes. 35
Arbitration is generally conducted by a threE~-member
tribunal. 36 At the request, or with the approval, of the disputing parties, the arbitrators may seek expert assistance concerning environmental, health, safety or other scientific issues
of fact. 37 Under any of the applicable arbitration rules, the proceedings and findings of the tribunals are confidential and may
be made public only if both parties agree. 38 It is also important
to note that the arbitration rules do not permit participation by
or submissions from interested or affected non-parties. 39

34. See id. arts. 1115-38.
35. See id art. 1120(1). These rules are those established by the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18,
1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter "ICSID Convention"), provided that the disputing
Party and the Party of the investor are parties to the ICSID Convention (Canada is
not); the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, if either (but not both) the disputing Party
or the Party of the investor is a Party to the ICSID Convention; or the Arbitration
Rules of the UN Commission on International Trade Law, approved by the UN General
Assembly on Dec. 15, 1976. Three of the first four NAFTA chapter 11 disputes were
filed with the ICSID, which is apparently pushing to be the "tribunal of choice" for
NAFTA challenges. See AMERICASTRADE, June 11, 1998, at 4.
36. See NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1123. Each party to the arbitration appoints
one arbitrator and they must agree on the third. See id. If they cannot agree within 90
days, either party may request that the SecretarY-General of the ICSID appoint the
remaining arbitrator. See id.
37. See id. art. 1133.
38. See e.g., 'Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, ICSID, Rule 32(2)
(visited April 8, 1999) <http://www.internationalaldadr.comltc1l51.htm> (on file with
author) ("The tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other persons besides the parties ... may attend the hearings.); Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
art. 21.3 (visited Dec. 15, 1998)
<http://www.iccwbo.org/html/rulesenglish.htm> (on file with author) (without approval
of arbitral tribunal, "persons not involved in the proceedings shall not be admitted");
id. App. I, Statutes of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art. 6 ("The
work of the Court is of a confidential nature and must be respected by everyone who
participates in that work in whatever capacity."); id. App. II, Internal Rules of the
International Court of Arbitration of the ICC, art. 1 (sessions of Court open only to
members, except upon invitation by Court; documents confidential). The attorney for
one of the NAFTA chapter 11 claims brought against Canada defended the confidentiality provisions as preventing long and costly court litigation through an agreement to
provide a greater number of internal documents in return for confidentiality. InterPress Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.
39. See, e.g., Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, supra
note 38, art. 21.3. In US courts, individuals or organizations with an interest in a case
can participate as a "friend of the court" or, if resolution of the case will affect their
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The tribunal must decide the claim in accordance with the
NAFTA and "applicable rules of international law."40 If the
tribunal fmds that the Party's action was "tantamount to nationalization or expropriation," it may award monetary damages and interest, restitution of property and/or costs of bringing the claim. 41
Once an arbitral award is final, the investor has several options for ensuring that it obtains payment from the country in
question. First, Chapter 11 requires each Party to ''provide for
the enforcement of an award in its territory."42 The investor
may also request that its own government espouse its claim
before the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which then must
initiate an intergovernmental arbitration to determine whether
the failure to comply with the award is inconsistent with the
obligations of NAFTA and, if appropriate, to recommend that
the Party comply.43 Finally, the investor may seek enforcement
under the international arbitration rules recognized in Chapter
11.44 One such rule, for example, requires each government to
treat arbitration awards
as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territory as if it were a
fmal judgment of a court in that State. A Contracting
State with a federal constitution may enforce such an
award in or through its federal courts and may provide
that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the courts of a constituentI state. 45

rights or interests strongly enough, they can actually intervene as a party. See FED. R.
Cry. P. 24, FED. R. ApP. P. 29.
40. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1131(1).
41. [d. art. 1135. The arbitrators may not award punitive damages. See id. at
646, art. 1135.3.
42. [d. art. 1136.4.
43. [d. art. 1136.5.
44. See NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1136.6.
45. ICSID Convention, supra note 35, at 194, art. 54(1). This requirement is implemented in 22 U.S.C. § 1650(a), which provides that arbitral awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention
shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States. The pecuniary
obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of
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NAFTA's investment provisions are subject to several provisions regarding the environment. First, the investment chapter itself includes a provision on "Environmental Measures":
1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent
a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure[46] otherwise consistent with this Chapter that
it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns.
2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety
or· environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Party
should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to
waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of
an investor.47
In addition to the investment-specific environmental provisions, several other NAFTA provisions highlight environmental
issues. The Preamble states the Parties' intention to achieve
NAFTA's goals "in a manner consistent with environmental
protection and conservation," to "promote sustainable development," and to "strengthen the development and enforcement of
environmental laws and regulations. "48
Additional protection for environmental measures is made
through the incorporation of the general exceptions to the Gen-

general jurisdiction of one of the several States.... The district courts of the
United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction over actions and proceedings
under [these provisionsl.
22 U.S.C. § 1650(a). See also LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(court has jurisdiction to enforce award rendered pursuant to ICSID procedures).
46. NAFTA defines "measure" as including "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice." NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 201.l.
47. Id. art. 1114. If a Party considers that another Party has relaxed measures to
attract investment, "it may request consultations with the other Party and the two
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such encouragement." Ill. art. 1114.2.
48. Id. pmbl.
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eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 49 Those exceptions provide:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where similar conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in [the GATT]
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption. 50
Any consideration of the treatment of environmental measures under NAFTA must also take into account the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC),
the "environmental side agreement" to NAFTA 51 In the
NAAEC, the Parties to NAFTA recognized the need to conserve, protect and enhance the environment in their territories
and reaffmned the importance of "enhanced levels of environmental protection. "52 Among the environmental objectives of

49. [d. art. 2101 ("GATT Article XX and, its interpretative notes ... [isl incorporated into and made part of this Agreement.").. The investment chapter specifically
states that "[iln the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and another
Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." [d. art.
1112.
50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, 262 !hereinafter GATT]. NAFTA clarifies two points regarding these exceptions
that have been challenged under the GATT procedures: that Article XX(b) includes
environmental measures and that both living and non-living natural resources fall
within Article XX(g). NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 2101.1.
51. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), Sept. 8,
9,12, 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480.
52. [d. prmbl. The preamble to the NAAEC also reaffirmed the countries' commitment to the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, both of which recognize that "environmental
protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be
considered in isolation from it." Rio Declaration, supra note 12, prine. 4. See also
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the NAAEC are to "foster the protection and improvement of
the environment ... for the well-being of present and future
generations"; to cooperate to "better conserve, protect and enhance the environment," and develop and improve environmental laws and regulations; to "enhance compliance with, and
enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations"; and to
"promote pollution prevention policies and practices. "f>3
One of the NAAEC's most important provisions concerning
environmental laws and regulations is Article 3:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own
levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, . and to
adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and
regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and
regulations provide for high levels of environmental protections and shall strive to continue to improve those
laws and regulations. 54
As these provisions demonstrate, any interpretation or application of NAFrA's investment provisions must talce into account the importance that the Parties placed on preventing the
agreement from interfering with environmental protection.
C.

THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAl)

Investment protections like those provided by NAFTA, including protection against expropriation, are included in regional agreements in other parts of the worldM and may Boon
become part of a global investment agreement. The European

United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, June 16, 1972, prine. 6, U.N. Doc. AlConf.48/14, revised by U.N.
Doc. AlConf.4B114/Corr.1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) ("To defend and improve the
human environment for present and future generations has become an imperative goal
for mankind .... ").
53. NAAEC, supra note 51, art. 154. [d. art. 3 (emphasis added).
55. See, e.g., An Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec.
15,1987, ASEAN Nations, 27 I.L.M. 612; European Energy Charter Treaty, reprinted
in UNCTAD, II INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 539
(1996).
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Union and Mexico are discussing a free trade agreement that is
likely to include investment protections in some form. 56 In addition, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is
likely to include investment provisions. 57
The first serious proposal to apply investment protections
on a global level came from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of 29 of the
world's richest countries. 58 Since 1995, the OECD has been
negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl),
the goal of which was to "create a comprehensive investment
discipline, backed up by a dispute settlement mechanism which
includes investor to state procedures."59 In October 1998, as a
result of "significant concerns" regarding the agreement, including "issues of sovereignty, protection of labour rights and
environment, culture and other important matters," the OECD
indefmitely suspended further negotiations on the agreement. 60

56. See Mexico, EU FTA Proposals Clash over Coverage of Investment, Services,
AMERlCASTRADE, Nov. 26, 1998, l.
57. See AMERlCASTRADE, Nov. 26, 1998 at 1; AMERlCASTRADE, Sept. 17, 1998 at 5.
The United States considers the NAFTA investment chapter "comparable to a BIT" and
considers its BITs to "complement and support regional initiatives on investment liberalization in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) imd the [FTAA) initiative." FACT SHEET, supra note 16.
58. The member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. OECD
countries share "principles of the market economy, pluralist democracy and respect for
human rights." OECD, Membership, <http://www.oecd.orglaboutlgenerallmembercountries.htm> (on file with author). OECD countries produce two-thirds of the world's
goods and services. See id. See also What is OECD, <http://www.oecd.orglaboutlgenerall
index.htm> (on file with author).
59. Jan Huner, Environment Regulation and International Agreements: Lessons
from the MAl (paper delivered at the Royal Institute for International Affairs Conference on Trade, Investment and Environment, Oct. 29-30, 1998), <http://www. islandnet.coml-ncfs/maisiteJpov-mai3.htm> (on file with author).
60. OECD News Release, (Oct. 23, 1998) <http://www.oecd.orglnews_and_eventsl
releaselnw98-101a.htm> (on file with author). The OECD had temporarily suspended
MAl negotiations in April 1998, intending to resume efforts in November after a period
of consultation with representatives of civil society. Environmentalists Claim Victory
as Talks on Multilateral Investment Pact Founder, 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 22 at 1053
(Oct. 28,1998). According to the Secretary of the OECD's MAl Negotiating Group, the
primary problem with the MAl was that
its negotiators did not expect to have to sell it politically. Most of the MAInegotiators are (were) investment specialists not used to viewing from a politi-
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Despite the suspension, there remains a consensus among
OECD member countries on "the need for and value of a multilateral framework for investment. The goal should still be
sought."Iil The OECD's continued interest in the subject is reflected in its conference on Foreign Direct Investment and the
Environment, held at The Hague, January 28-29, 1999. 62 It is
thus likely that efforts to develop such a global investment
agreement will resume in the near future, possibly under the
auspices of the WTO.63 In addition, "investment discussions in
UNCTAD, the WTO, APEC and the FrAA are all looking to the
MAl as a model for multilateral rules."64
In April 1998, partly as a result of criticism that the MAl
negotiations had been too secretive,65 the OECD released what

cal perspective the concepts that they consider logical and essential parts of an
investment discipline. ... Least of all [did they expect) to see the MAl portrayed as a threat to environmental protection.
Huner, supra note 59. Huner also notes that "the issue of how the MAl relates to multilateral environmental agreements (MEA's) was not discussed" during the early years
of MAl negotiations and, with the exception of Washington, was likely "not a subject
for debate in [national) capitals either." Id. The Chairman of the Negotiating Group
made a last-ditch effort to salvage MAl negotiations by proposing a package of environment and labor provisions, but "the Europeans saw too many NAFTA-inspired
texts, and the Americans opposed making the not lowering of standards clause binding." Id.
61. OECD News &lease, supra note 60.
62. See Foreign Direct Investment and the Environment, <http://www.oecd.org/dafl
env/index.htm> (on file with author).
63. See 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 22 at 1053, supra note 60. Opschoor, supra note
10. The April 1998 OECD ministerial declaration stated that the OECD governments
"support the current work programme on investment in the WTO and once the work
programme has been completed will seek support of all their partner, for the next
steps towards the creation of investment rules in the WTO." OECD, Ministerial
Statement on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAl), Apr. 28, 1998, (visited
on Oct. 26, 1998) <http://www.oecd.orgllnews_and_eventslreleaselnw98-50a.htm> (on
file with author).
64. Larson Testimony, supra note 15.
65. The Secretary ofOECD's MAl Negotiating Group (NG) has explained that
[w)hen pressure from NGO's [concerning the secrecy surrounding MAl
negotiations) began to rise, the chairman of the NG suggestt.'Ci that
NG documents, in particular draft texts, had perhaps better be declassified. This was not approved by a minority of countries. One of
the arguments for not releasing texts was that in doing so [the OECD
countries) might find ourselves having to negotiate with NGO's.about
them. This prompted Canada to say that it had already put draft
texts on the Internet site of the ministry, and it would continue to do
so.
Huner, supra note 59.
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it called the "MAl Negotiating Text," which was a consolidation
of "the text of the agreement considered in the course of the
MAl negotiations" to that point,66 and an official Commentary
to the draft.67 Although the text is far from final,68 and the
schedule and process for further negotiations are unclear, it
indicates the basic thrust of discussions to this point.
With a few exceptions, the fundamental provisions of the
draft MAl are essentially the same as those ofNAFTA.69 Thus,
the Negotiating Text requires the better of national and mostfavored-nation treatment,70 and prohibits performance requirements 71 and limitations on transfers. 72
With respect to expropriation, the MAl Negotiating Text is
essentially identical to the NAFTA provision. 73 Like NAFTA,

66. The MAl Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998) <http://oecd.orglldaflcmisl
mailmaitext.pdf> (on file with author) [hereinafter MAl Negotiating Text].
67. Commentary to the MAl Negotiating Text (as of 24 April 1998)
<http://www.oecd.orglldaf/cmislmailMAICOME.PDF> (on file with author) [hereafter
MAl Commentary].
68. The text results "mainly from the work of expert groups and [has} not yet been
adopted by the MAl Negotiating Group." [d.
69. One such exception is the MAl Negotiating Text's definition of "investment,"
which is broader than NAFTA's. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 11, 1.2 & n.2.
According to the OECD Commentary to the MAl Negotiating Text, the definition is
intended to cover "all recognized and evolving forms of investment [and} would include
the products of an investment." MAl Commentary, supra note 67 (emphasis in the
original). The Commentary further indicates support for expanding the definition of
investment-via the inclusion of assets controlled "indirectly"-to include investments
owned or controlled by non-MAl investors, as long as there is some connection to an
MAl investor, as through a subsidiary from an MAl country that directly controls the
investment or by virtue of the parent of the investor being from an MAl country. [d. at
6. An investment of a domestic investor would even be covered if the investor was
owned or controlled by a foreign investor from an MAl member country. See id. at 2(d).
70. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 13, III. The MAl Commentary explains that national treatment is violated by de facto as well as de jure discrimination.
MAl Commentary, supra note 67, at 8.
71. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 18, III.
72. [d. at 59, IVA.
73. The Secretary of the MAl Negotiating Group noted that the Ethyl-Canada
NAFTA dispute, described infra, text accompanying notes 106-134, had caused MAl
negotiators to "think twice before copying the expropriation provisions of the NAFTA."
Huner, supra note 59. Nevertheless, the draft MAl provision was nearly identical to
the NAFTA provision:
A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or indirectly
an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or
take any measure or measures having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred
to as "expropriation") except:

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 6

484 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:465
the Negotiating Text does not defme "expropriation," but the
Commentary notes that by extending protection to "measures
having equivalent effect" to expropriation, the Text was intended to cover "creeping expropriation."74
The MAl Negotiating Text follows the NAFTA example for
dispute settlement as well, providing investors the l'ight to initiate binding arbitration concerning claims that government
action has violated the Agreement and caused "loss or damage
to the investor or its investment."75 Although the Text establishes procedures allowing a nation to challenge another nation's failure to abide by the provisions of the agreement,76 it
gives priority to challenges brought against nations by investors. 77
Like NAFTA, if the three-member arbitral panel that fmds
that a country has violated the Agreement, it may award
monetary compensation for injury or losses suffered by the investor78 and restitution in kind (meaning the return of the
property in question). 79 In a state to state arbitration, the
panel may also recommend that the losing Party bring its actions into conformity with its obligations under the

a) for a purpose which is in the public interest,
b) on a non-discriminatory basis,
c) in accordance with due process of law, and
d) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation ....
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 57, IV.2.2.1.
74. MAl Commentary, supra note 67, at 3D, IV.2.5.
75. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 63, V.D.
76. [d. at 63-69, V.A-C.
77 . A Contracting Party may not initiate proceedings under this Article
for a dispute which its investor has submitted, or consented to submit,
to arbitration under [the MAIl, unless the other Contracting Party
has failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in that
dispute or those proceedings have terminated without resolution by
an arbitral tribunal of the investor's claim.
[d. at 65, V.C.l.b.
78. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 67, V.C.6.c (state-state disputes,
proceedings and awards); id. at 75, V.D.16.a (investor-state disputes, final awards). In
investor-state arbitration, interest from the time of loss or damage is also available.
See id.
79. In a state-state arbitration, restitution is available only with the agreement of
the losing Party; in an investor-state arbitration, the losing Party need not agree, but
has the right to pay monetary compensation instead, if restitution is "not practicable."
[d. at 67, V.C.6.c (state-state); id. at 75, V.D.16.a (investor-state).
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Agreement.SO The MAl Negotiating Text provides for enforcement of arbitral awards through domestic law, in the case of
investor-state disputes ,81 and through retaliatory sanctions m
the case of state-state disputes. 82
At least some MAl negotiators wanted the agreement to
recognize environmental concerns. 83 This gave rise to a proposal for a ''three-anchor [environmental] approach":
The fIrst anchor would be the preamble, which should
reaffirm Parties' commitment to the relevant principles
of the Rio Declaration and to the relevant multilateral
agreements. [84] The second anchor would be a provision

80. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 67, V.C.6.c.ii.
8!. [d. at 76, V.D.16.c ("An arbitration award shall be fmal and binding between
the parties to the dispute and shall be carried out without delay by the party against
whom it is issued, subject to its post-award rights under the arbitral systems utilised."), V.D.18 ("Each Contracting Party shall provide for the enforcement of the pecuniary obligations imposed by an award rendered pursuant to [the investor-state arbitration provisionsl.").
82. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66 at 69, V.C.9. The Negotiating Text is
not very well developed on this point. The draft proposes two alternative provisions for
giving enforcement powers to states that have received a favorable award with which
the challenged state has not complied. One allows the state to "take measures in response" to the noncompliance. [d., V.C.9.a. The other allows it to "suspend the application to the other Contracting party of obligations under this agreement" other than
the obligations relating to general treatment and expropriation. [d., V.C.9.a-b. The
Text also proposes giving all of the other parties to the MAl some role in approving
such measures and suspending the non-complying party's right to participate in decisions concerning the Agreement. [d. V.C.9.c.
83. According to the Secretary of the Negotiating Group, not all OECD members
agreed that the MAl should address the environment. Until the victory of the Labour
party in the United Kingdom, the UK took a contrary position. See Huner, supra note
59. Other opponents were Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Mexico ("perhaps the
strongest critic"). [d. In addition, these "anchor" environmental provisions were
"poorly received in business circles, particularly in the United States." [d. Even the
United States-which, in the Secretary's opinion, was the only nation with experience
(from the NAFTA debates) in the relationship between investment and the environment-did not raise environmental issues until late in the negotiations. [d.
84. One draft of the MAl's preamble reaffirmed the parties' commitment to sustainable development and expressed their recognition that "investment, as an engine of
economic growth, can play a key role in ensuring that growth is sustainable, when
accompanied by appropriate environmental policies to ensure it takes place in an environmentally sound manner." OECD, MAl Draft, October 6,1997, <http://www.oecd.org/
daflcmis/mailnegtext.htm> (emphasis added) (on file with author). The 1998 Negotiating Text proposed a different version:
[Recognizing that appropriate environmental policies can playa key role in
ensuring that economic development, to which investment contributes, is
sustainable,) and resolving to [desiring to) implement this agreement [in ac-
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built on NAFTA Article 1114, stating that environmental and social standards as contained in national
laws and regulations should not be lowered in order to
attract an investment. The main debate here has been
whether or not this should be a binding provision.
NAFTA 1114 only says that such lowering of standards
is "inappropriate." The third anchor was investor performance on environmental protection. 85
In addition, the United States proposed adding a general environmental exception, essentially identical to NAFTA Article
1114(1).86
Finally, the Negotiating Text proposed to recognize the
right of each country to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental laws and regulations. 87 The Text proposes to implement this understanding through an interpretive note to the
expropriation provision clarifying that the provision does not
require compensation for investment losses due to "regulation
... and other normal [governmental] activity in the public interest. "88

cordance with international environmental law andl in a manner consistent
with sustainable development, as reflected in the Rio Declaration on Envi·
ronment and Development and Agenda 21, [including the protection and
preservation of the environment and principles of the polluter pays and the
precautionary approachl.
MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 7-8 (brackets in original).
85. Huner, supra note 59.
86. See MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 123. The exception proposed by
the United States would have provided: "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise
consistent with its Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." ld. In testimony before Congress, Alan Larson, Assistant U.S. Secretary of
Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, stated that a primary US objective in the
MAl is "to ensure that the MAl contributes to the achievement of our goal of fostering
stronger global efforts to protect the environment ... and to achieve sustainable development." Larson Testimony, supra note 15.
87. MAl Negotiating Text, supra note 66, at 123.
88. ld. at 141. The Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs noted that these provisions would implement the understanding that "[nlormal
regulatory actions, even when they affect the value of an investment, should not be
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IV. CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND
REGULATIONS UNDER NAFTA
As noted above,89 international arbitration proceedings are

extremely confidential. In addition to excluding those who may
be directly affected by the results of the arbitration, this secrecy makes it very difficult to obtain complete and accurate
factual information regarding NAFTA expropriation claims.
The cases described in this section are based on information
that is publicly available. With one exception (the Ethyl case),
none of the parties to the arbitration has made its submissions
public. It is therefore possible that these descriptions omit certain relevant factual information or legal claims. Nevertheless,
the case descriptions clearly demonstrate the conflict between
the NAFTA expropriation provisions and government efforts to
protect the environment. 90

considered as an expropriation requiring compensation." Quoted in Alan Larson, Environmental, &gulatory Safeguards, 15 ENVI'L. FORUM 46, 51 (1998).
89. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. .
90. To date, there have been eight claims brought under NAFTA's investment
provisions. The cases described in the text are those that raise the issues discussed in
this article most clearly and with respect to which the clearest factual information is
available. A summary of the other claims follows.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada I Pope & Talbot, Inc., a Delaware-based wood-products
company, obtains approximately 75% of its wood from British Columbia. See Pope &
Talbot SEC Filing, Form 10-K, Wood Products Business, Mar. 31, 1998; see also Pope &
Talbot SEC Filing, Form 10-Q, Nov. 13, 1998. The most lucrative portion of the wood
products business is lumber production which accounted for $219,698,000.00 in sales
for the company in 1997. See id. In 1996, pursuant to the CanadalUS Softwood Lumber Agreement, the two nations agreed to establish volume quotas for each company
shipping Canadian softwood lumber to the United States. See Pope & Talbot SEC
Filing, Form 10-K, Wood Products Business, Mar. 31, 1998. In the second year of this
regime, Pope & Talbot's quota was decreased from what it had been the previous year.
See id. Claiming that this reduction was unfair, the company filed a notice of intent to
initiate arbitration under NAFTA's chapter 11 on February 17, 1999. Pope & Talbot
Press Release, Pope & Talbot Issues Challenge to Unfair Softwood Quota (Feb. 17,
1999) <http://www.poptal.comllnews.htm> (on file with author). If negotiations between Pope & Talbot and Canada do not resolve the dispute, the company may initiate
arbitration in May 1999.
DESONA v. Mexico: Desechos Solidos de Naucalpan (DESONA), a US waste management company, claims that the council of the Mexican county of Naucalpan nullified
a 15-year waste management concession between the two parties. On December 9,
1996, DESONA notified the government of Mexico of its intent to file a claim through
the ICSm Additional Facility Rules and in March 1997 it filed a notice of claim with
the ICSm. ICSm has accepted and registered the claim, and the first session of the
arbitral tribunal was to be held September 26, 1997. No further information concern-
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A

THE METALCLAD CASE

In 1995, the Mexican federal government authorized
Quimica Omega de Mexico, a subsidiary of the US-based
Metalclad Corporation, to take over and operate a toxic waste
facility in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. 91 The facility
had a history of contaminating local groundwater. Metalclad
reportedly spent $22 million preparing the facility. 92

From before the outset of this project, Metalclad was aware
that its "proposed business in Mexico is highly regulated and is
subject to Mexican Environmental law."ga This law regulates
both the construction and operation of hazardous waste facili-

ing this claim is available. USTR Update on WTO, NAFTA Dispute Settlement Cases
(visited on May 3, 1999) <http:www.usia.gov/topical/econlwtolwtxt0919.htm> (on file
with author). See also West, AMERICAN LAWYER, Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Magazine File.
Sun Belt Water Inc. v. Canada: In 1990, six companies, including Snowcap Water,
held licenses issued by the government of British Columbia (BC) for the bulk export of
what was considered "surplus" water. Public opposition to these exports on conserva·
tion grounds lead to a temporary moratorium on water exports and, eventually, the BC
Water Protection Act, RS.B.C. Chapt. 484 (1996) (Can.), banned such exports permanently. In 1996, the BC government settled with Snowcap for $335,000, the amount it
had spent creating an infrastructure to export water. In December 1998, Sun Belt, a
US corporation that was a partner in a joint venture with Snowcap, brought a claim
under NAFTA's Chapter 11 for as much as US$219 million for lost business opportunities resulting from the ban. Sun Belt's claims are based on violations of the national
treatment and minimum standard of treatment provisions.
Sun Belt Filing,
AMERICASTRADE, Dec. 24,1998, at 13.
Loewen Group v. United States: The Loewen Group, a Canadian funeral services
firm, brought a NAFTA investment claim against the United States after it lost a civil
contract suit brought by a competing US funeral services company in Mississippi court.
The court awarded the US company $500 million and Loewen, which had filed for
bankruptcy, was unable to pay the requisite 125% bond to appeal the case. Loewen
brought the NAFTA claim on the basis that the suit against it violated NAFTA's national treatment, minimum treatment and expropriation provisions. AMERICASTRADE,
Nov. 26,1998, at 20.
USA Waste v. Mexico: A US waste management company, USA Waste, brought a
NAFTA Chapter 11 claim at the ISCID against Mexico based on the city of Acapulco's
failure to pay for street sweeping services provided by USA Waste under a 15-year
concession agreement signed in 1995. AMERICASTRADE, June 11, 1998, at 3-4.
91. According to Metalclad, it was "invited" to operate the facility. See Metalclad
Announces It Has Suspended Construction in Mexico, Metalclad Corp. Press Release,
Sept. 30, 1998. See also Carmelo Lodise, San Miguel's Draining Struggle, BUSINESS
MEXICO, Dec. 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Magazine File.
92. See Joel Millman, Metalclad Suit Is First Against Mexico Under NAFTA Foreign-Investment Rules, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 14, 1997, at A2.
93. Metalclad SEC Filing, Form 10-KT (Apr. I, 1997), Item 1(a).
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ties, and requires environmental impact studies and permits
from the National Institute of Ecology (lNE), as well as local
and state agencies. 94 Operation of such facilities and compliance with INE regulations is subject to continual monitoring by
the Federal Attorney for the Protection of the Environment. 95
Environmentalists and local citizens were not satisfied with
the environmental impact assessment for the facility, and successfully pressed the local government not to permit its operation. 96 In late 1996, the· Governor of San Luis Potosi deemed
the facility to be an environmental hazard to surrounding
communities and ordered the Metalclad waste facility shut
down. 97 The Governor's decision was supported by a geological
audit performed by environmental impact analysts at the University of San Luis Potosi, who found that the facility was located on an underground alluvial stream and could therefore
contaminate the local water supply.98 The Governor subsequently declared the site part of a 600,000 acre ecological
zone. 99

On January 2, 1997, Metalclad filed a claim with the ICSID
against the Mexican government under the NAFTA investment
chapter. loo The complaint alleges, among other things, that
"having been denied the right to operate its constructed and
permitted facility, its property has therefore been, as a practical matter, expropriated, entitling the Company to the fair

94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Trying to Give the NACEC Teeth, in LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL REPORTS:
MEXICO AND NAFTA REPORTS 4 (May 9, 1996).
97. Antonia Juhasz, Update on Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE MAl (Feb. 2, 1998.)
98. See Preamble Center for Public Policy, Update on Metalclad Corporation v.
Mexico (visited on Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.islandnet.coml-ncfslmaisite/efTect
13.htm> (on file with author).
'
99. See id. See also Guadalcazar, zona ecol6gica en SLP; descartado, reabrir el
confinamiento, NOTICIERO PECUARIO, 17 Sept. 1997 (visited Feb. 3, 1999)
<http://www.veterin.unam.mxlfmvzunamlI7sep97.htm> (on file with author).
100. See Metalclad, SEC filing, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/13547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> (on file with author). See also Juhasz, supra
note 97.
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market value of the facility as damages. "101 Metalclad asserted
that the facility was worth $90 million. 102
In July 1997, a three member arbitration tribunal met to
address the claim. 103 On October 13, 1997, Metalclad fIled a
memorial that included the claim and all the evidence supporting the claim, including expert witness studies. On February 17, 1998, the Mexican government fIled a response, to
which Metalclad replied on August 21.104 Mexico responded
with a number of procedural objections concerning allegations
and evidence that Metalclad should be permitted to submit. 105
On November 13, 1998, the tribunal rejected Mexico's complaints and ordered Mexico to respond on the merits of the case
by March 19, 1999. 106
B.

THE ETHYL CORPORATION CASE

In April 1997, Canada enacted a law making it a crime to
import, or trade between provinces, manganese-based sub-

101. Metalclad SEC filing, Apr. I, 1997; Metalclad SEC filing, Nov. 20: 1998,
<http://www.sec.gov/Archivesledgar/datalI3547/0000013547·98·000023.txt> (on file
with author) (characterizing its claim as "one likened to expropriation. The Company's
position is since it is not being allowed to operate a legally authorized project, it has in
essence been taken by the Mexican government."). Metalclad also argued that Mexico
violated the national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment requirements and
had imposed illegal performance requirements. See Juhasz, supra note 97, The national treatment violation is apparently based on the assertion that the refusal to per~
mit Metalclad's facility to operate is intended to protect a Mexican waste disposal company called Rimsa. See Fernando Cesarman, Buen Periodismo, EI Destino de la Basura, EXCELSIOR: Editorial, 18 Aug. 1997 (visited on Feb. 24, 1999) <http://excelsior.
com.mxl97081970818/art07 .html>.
102. See Metalclad SEC filing, form 10-Q, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/
Archivesledgar/datalI3547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> (on file with author); Juhasz,
supra note 97.
103. Under the arbitration rules, each party has the right to select one panel member; the third is chosen jointly. Metalclad appointed former US Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti. See Jim Bryan, TechStocks.com discussion group, Metalclad
Corp. (MTLC) (June 9, 1997) <http://www4.techstocks.com/-wsapilinvestor/Subject15440:> (on file with author). The third arbitrator is from Great Britain. See Metalclad
SEC Filing, Form 10-Q, Nov. 20, 1998.
104. See Metalclad SEC Filing, Nov. 20, 1998, <http://www.sec.gov/Archivesl
edgar/datalI3547/0000013547-98-000023.txt> (on file with author).
105. See id.
106. Id. Metalclad "expects to request an oral hearing to be held as soon as possible
after Mexico's final filing, following which a decision is expected to be rendered by the
Tribunal." Id.
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stances, including methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), a fuel additive designed to prevent automobile
engine knocking. 107 Automobile manufacturers had asserted
that MMT harms automobile on-board diagnostic systems,
which in turn could lead to a failure to detect high levels of
pollutant emissions. 108 According to Canada's Environmental
Health Directorate, excess exposure to manganese compounds
can cause adverse neurological effects, leading to symptoms
similar to mild Parkinson's disease. 109
On April 14, 1997, five days after the ban passed the Parliament and eleven days before it received Royal Assent, Ethyl
Corporation, a U.s. corporation with a wholly-owned Canadian
subsidiary that is the sole Canadian importer, processor and
distributor of MMT, filed notice of arbitration pursuant to
NAFTA's investment chapter. llo Among other allegations, the
notice claimed that the Canadian law constituted an expropriation of Ethyl's business in Canada, subject to the compensation

107. See Manganese-Based Fuel Additives Act (MBFAA), Ch. 11, 1997 S.C. (Can.).
I am indebted to David A. Wirth, Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, for
his work in uncovering and untangling many of the facts of this claim.
MBFAA gave the Minister of the Environment limited authority to waive the prohibition for uses other than as gasoline additives. [d. § 5. According to Ethyl, use as a
gasoline additive is "a principal use of MMT," although "MMT is also used by Ethyl
Corporation in other fuel products." Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, Notice of
Arbitration Under Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the North Americ~ Free Trade Agreement 6 (Apr. 14, 1997)
!hereinafter Notice of Arbitration] (on file with author).
108. For a summary of the scientific evidence concerning these possible effects and
a discussion of the treatment of MMT by the US EPA, see Jesus Juanos I Timoneda,
The Legal Dynamics of the Regulation of MMT: Air Quality Standards and the Salt
Lake City Airshed, 17 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 283 (1997), in which the author
concludes that there are "numerous, diverse, sometimes conflicting, reasons to support"
all positions concerning the use of the additive, but that one variable, "the incidence of
MMT's combustion products on the amount of particulate matter in a given airshed,"
"deserves considerable regulatory attention ... because of its proven harmful effects on
health and welfare." [d. at 307,312.
109. See ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DIREcrORATE, HEALTH CANADA, RISK ASSESSMENT FOR THE COMBUSTION PRODUcrS OF METHYLCYCLOPENTADIENYL MANGANESE TRICARBONYL (MMT) IN GASOLINE (Dec. 6, 1994). At least some studies suggested a health risk due to breathing exhaust from cars running on gasoline containing
MMT. A University of Quebec neurophysiologist stated in April 1996 that tests on
laboratory animals suggested that exposure to manganese could speed up the aging
process, and that young children "may be particularly at risk" because of the potential
for the deterioration of brain tissues. SOUTHAM NEWS, Apr. 20, 1996 (visited on June
11, 1998) reprinted in <http://www.achilles.netl-jameshlmmt.htm>
110. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107.
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requirement ofNAFTA's article 1110.111 Ethyl sought US $250
million in compensation for the expropriation of its investment
in Canada. This amount included loss of sales and profits in
Canada,112 loss of value of Ethyl Canada,113 loss of "world-wide
sales due to other countries relying on" the measures taken by
Canada, "the cost of reducing operations in Canada," expenses
incurred in "defending itself against allegations made by Canada" and lobbying to defeat the law, 114 and its "goodwill both
inside and outside Canada. "115
Ethyl cited international law in support of its expropriation
claim. In particular, Ethyl stated that bilateral investment
treaties, "which are substantially similar to the NAFTA's investment protection provisions" have been interpreted as requiring compensation for "indirect expropriation": "'Where the
effect is similar to what might have occurred under an outright
expropriation, the investor would in all likelihood be covered
under most BIT provisions. mUG According to Ethyl,
An expropriation therefore exists whenever there is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of a property right .... Article 1110 of the
NAFTA does not prevent governmental regulatory actions. It requires governments to compensate investors

111. See id. at 3,10-18. The notice also alleged violations ofthe national treatment
obligations of NAFTA's article 1102, through discriminatory treatment of a US investor. Ethyl noted that the Minister of the Environment had stated that nothing would
keep Ethyl from building a MMT production plant in Canada and that "[t]here is no
reasonable or plausible explanation why domestically produced MMT is permitted for
sale in Canada while imported MMT is not." Ethyl also argued that the ban imposed a
performance requirement-in the form of an effective requirement that MMT sold in
Canada "have 100% Canadian content"-in violation ofNAFTA article 1106. [d. at 13.
112. Ethyl noted that "the sale of MMT represents some 50% of Ethyl Canada's total sales revenue." [d. at 11.
113. Ethyl threatened that the 50% loss of sales revenue "could cause the parent
company to re-evaluate maintaining a Canadian operation." [d. at 12.
114. [d. at 18.
115. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 6, 15-18. In its Notice of Arbitration,
Ethyl claimed that "the Government's statements [concerning the additive] created
public distrust" and "animosity" towards MMT. [d. at 6, 15.
116. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 14, at 100).
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for interference with their property rights as set out in
the NAFTA.117
Ethyl argued that the Canadian measure was a discriminatory attempt to protect domestic industry, rather than a legitimate restriction for environmental or health reasons. Ethyl
asserted that the Canadian Ministry of Health ''has concluded
that MMT does not pose a threat to human health and no independent studies have concluded that MMT harms automobile
diagnostic systems."118 According to Ethyl, if the ban had been
a health or environmental measure, Canada would have enacted it pursuant to the authority of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), which provides authority for the
regulation of the production and manufacture of toxic substances. 119 Ethyl claimed that there had not been sufficient
scientific support for the government of Canada to prohibit
MMT under CEPA or Canadian health laws. 12O Ethyl supported its discrimination claim by noting that MMT was only
one of a number of fuel additives that Canada could have
regulated; that Ethyl, a foreign corporation, was the sole manufacturer of MMT; and that the law '\vill not ban MMT completely, but will make foreign-made MMT inaccessible to consumers in Canada. "121 For its part, the Government of Canada

117. ld. at 11. Ethyl also noted that Canada's Minister ofInternational Trade had
pointed out, in a letter to the Minister of the Environment, "that Canada's proposed
legislation could constitute a measure tantamount to expropriation ... [and] could be
inconsistent with Canada's NAFTA ... investment obligations." ld. at 12 (citing Letter
of the Hon. A. Eggleton to the Hon. S. Marchi (February 23, 1996».
118. ld. at 4. See also ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH DlRECfORATE, supra note 109, at
69 (concluding on the basis of exposure assessment that "all analyses indicate that the
combustion products of MMT in gasoline do not represent an added health risk to the
Canadian population").
119. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., Ch. 16, §§ 12, 14 (4th Supp.
1985) (Can.) [hereinafter CEPA].
120. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 5, 14-15. CEPA allows the government to regulate toxic substances, including "the· total, partial or conditional prohibition of the manufacture, use, processing, sale, offering for sale, import or export of the
substance or a product containing the substance." CEPA §34(1)(l). The Act defmes a
substance as toxic if it may have a harmful effect on the environment or constitute a
danger to human life. ld. § 11. The Act provides that, in assessing toxicity, the Minister of Health or of the Environment "may" collect data concerning the nature and effects of the substance. ld. §15.
121. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 4. In fact, there were reports that
some Canadian gasoline refmeries had continued to use MMT that they had stockpiled
before the ban took effect. John Urquhart, Canada Lifts Ban on Ethyl's Additive; U.S.
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claimed that it had restricted trade in MMT, as opposed to its
production, sale or use, because the Canadian constitution,
which shares environmental authority between federal and
provincial governments, places production and intraprovincial
use of a product beyond the legislative authority of the Canadian parliament. 122
With respect to the alleged lack of scientific support for the
Canadian law, Ethyl characterized the law as a "performance
requirement,"I23 with respect to which measures to protect life
or health or to conserve exhaustible natural resources are permitted only if they are "necessary."124 Ethyl stated that "[t]he
lack of any clear scientific evidence throws into doubt whether
[the Canadian MMT measure] is necessary to protect human
life or health. "125
Ethyl also cited jurisprudence interpreting GATT's Article
XX(b), which permits restrictions on trade where they are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. "126
Ethyl noted that GATT panels have interpreted "necessary" to
mean that the measure in question must be ''the least trade
restrictive measure possible. Hl27 Ethyl argued that an outright

Firm to Terminate Its Legal Fight, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 21, 1998 reprinted in
1998 WL-WSJ 3502397.
122. See Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment
and Natural Resources, Issue 12 - Evidence (Feb. 19, 1997) at 7, <http://www.parl.gc.
calenglishlsenate/com-e/enrg-e/12ev-e.htm> (visited Apr. 7, 1999) (testimony of Mr.
Jacques Fremont, Faculty of Law, University of Montreal) ("[U]nder the Canadian
Constitution, the provinces have full jurisdiction in relation to the production and the
manufacture of products of goods, including gasoline."); Debates of Senate (Canada), 2d
Sess., 35th Parliament, Vol. 136, Issue 61 (Dec. 12, 1996), (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.parl.gc.calenglishlsenate/deb-e/61db-e.html> (statement of Sen. Noel A.
Kinsella) ("the manufacturing of petroleum and that of automobiles falls under provincial jurisdiction").
123. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 12-13. Ethyl argued that because the
Canadian law banned only import and interprovincial trade in MMT, it could manufacture and sell MMT in Canada only if it built manufacturing and blending facilities in
each province. See id. at 13. The ban, therefore, required MMT sold in Canada to have
100% Canadian content and required Ethyl Canada to purchase all of its MMT from
Canadian producers. See id.
124. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1106.
125. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14.
126. See GATT, supra note 50, art. XX(b).
127. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14 (citing Restrictions on Importation
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT Doc. SD10/R, 37 B.I.S.D. 200 (1989-1990».
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ban on MMT, as opposed to a trade restriction giving domestic
producers an advantage over foreign producers, would be less
trade restrictive. l28 For that reason, according to Ethyl, the
Canadian law could not be considered "necessary."129
In July 1998, after a Canadian domestic trade panel ruled
in favor of several provincial governments that had brought a
claim that the ban violated Canada's Agreement on Internal
Trade,130 the government of Canada announced that it had settled Ethyl's NAFTA challenge. The settlement provided for a
payment of approximately US $13 million, including roughly
$4.5 million for legal fees. 131 In addition, the Minister of the
Environment, Christine Stewart, issued a letter to Ethyl stating: "Current scientific information fails to demonstrate that
MMT impairs the proper functioning of automotive on-board
diagnostic systems. Furthermore, there is no new scientific
evidence to modify conclusions drawn by Health Canada in
1994 that MMT poses no health risk."132 In a subsequent news
conference, Ms. Stewart said she remained concerned about
allegations concerning MMT, but stated: "[W]e do not have sufficient scientific evidence at the moment on which to base a
128. See id.
129. [d.
130. Agreement on Internal Trade, R.S.C. Chapt. 17 (1996) (Can.). The Agreement
on Internal Trade (AIT) applies principles of nondiscrimination and elimination of
trade obstacles to trade among provincial and other governments. The dispute resolution panel established by the AIT agreed with the governments of Alberta, Quebec,
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia that the ban on manganese-based substances was a
restriction on the right of movement across provincial boundaries and an obstacle to
internal trade, both of which are prohibited by the AlT. REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 1704
PANEL CONCERNING A DISPUTE BETWEEN ALBERTA AND CANADA REGARDING THE
MANGANESE-BASED FuEL ADDITIVES ACT (Fil no. 97198-15-MMT-Po58 June 12, 1998).
The panel found that the manganese ban did not satisfy the AIT exception for otherwise legitimate governmental measures because the government had not demonstrated
that there existed "'such urgency or a risk so widespread as to warrant such comprehensive restrict[ionls as the Act provides on internal trade.'" AMERICASTRADE, July 23,
1998, at 14 (quoting decision of the AIT panel). The AIT panel considering the internal
trade ramifications of the law had concluded that the automobile manufacturers' "evidence as to the impact of MMT on the environment is, at best, inconclusive." [d. at 15.
The panel did note that it did not consider the law to be a "disguised restriction" on
internal trade. [d. at 14.
131. See Order Amending the Schedule to the Manganese-Based Fuel Additives
Act, SOR198-393, C. Gaz. 1998.II.2265 (July 20,1998). See also Government of Canada
Statement on MMT (July 20,1998).
132. Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, Failed Ban Becomes Selling Point for MMT, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, July 21, 1998 at A3.
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clear case that MMT in gasoline is causing severe problems to
either the environment or the health of Canadians. "133 With
respect to the effect on automobile emissions systems, Ms.
Stewart stated that, in introducing the ban in 1995, the government had relied on evidence from the auto industry that
had seemed "quite persuasive," but that the industry evidence
.now appeared insufficient.l34 She also stated that the Canadian government had not banned MMT directly because there
was no proof that it was toxic at low levels of exposure. 135
C.

THE SD MYERS CASE

On July 22, 1998, shortly after Canada settled the Ethyl
claim, SD Myers, Inc., a U.S. corporation with a facility to dispose of PCB wastes in Ohio, fIled a claim against Canada for
"not less than" $10 million, plus fees, costs and interest,l36 for
losses arising out of a 15 month Canadian ban on the export of
PCBs, which the company claimed to have been "tantamount to
expropriation" of its contracts to treat Canadian PCBs. 137

133. Jd. Both the automobile industry and some environmental groups continue to
express concern regarding the effects of MMT. The president of the Canadian Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association stated that the automobile industry had submitted
over 40 papers demonstrating MMT's effect on emission controls. See id. In addition,
preliminary studies by a neurotoxicologist at the University of Quebec apparently
suggest that "even low levels of manganese in the blood can have health effects, particularly in children and the elderly." Shawn McCarthy, Threat of NAJ.'TA Case Kills
Canada's MMT Ban, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 20, 1998 (visited on July 21, 1998)
reprinted in <http://www.theglobeandmail.com ... 9980720/GlobeFrontlummtn.html>.
The author of the study stated: "We know that in large concentrations, airborne manganese does pose a risk to human health. What we don't know is at what level does it
not pose a risk. There remain a lot of questions about manganese and we should know
a lot more about it before we use it." Jd .
. 134. Urquhart, supra note 121.
135. THE GLOBE AND MAIL, July 21, 1998, supra note 132. See also THE GLOBE AND
MAIL, July 20, 1998, supra note 133 ("Former environment ministers Sheila Copps and
Sergio Marchi both argued that they couldn't ban MMT directly because Health Canada had found there was not sufficient evidence that it was toxic at low levels. So they
resorted to the trade ban.").
136. Reports have placed SD Myers's estimate of its losses as high as $30 million.
See Ian Jack, Feds Face Lawsuit over PCBs: 1995 Ban under Nafta, FINANCIAL POST,
Oct. 30, 1998 at C8; U.S. Company Seeks Compensation for Losses Due to Canadian
PCB Export Ban, 21 INT'L ENV'T REP. No. 18 at 848 (company claims losses of $15
million). S.D. Myers's claim for fees and costs apparently included expenses incurred
in the company's opposition to the Canadian ban.
137. 21 INT'L. ENV'T REP. No. 18, supra note 135, at 848.
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Since 1977, U.S. law has prohibited the manufacture, processing and distribution in commerce of PCBS.I38 Pursuant to
, this law, EPA banned the imPOrl and export of PCBs in 1980. 139
Although the law allowed EPA to grant individual one-year
exemptions from this prohibition in certain circumstances,140 it
rarely did so. 141 Canada fIrst banned the export of PCB wastes
in 1990, although at that time it permitted the return of U.S.
government-owned PCB wastes to the United States for disposal. 142 In 1992, Canada ratifIed the Basel Convention on the
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal,l43 which prohibits countries from exporting
hazardous wastes, including PCBs, to nonparties like the
United States without ensuring that they will be managed in
an environmentally sound manner. 144 Canada implemented
these obligations in the Export and Import of Hazardous Waste
Regulations. 145 In December 1994, the United States proposed

138. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A).
139. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal,
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18, 1996). According to EPA, it had closed the border to PCB
transports "primarily because of both limited disposal capacity in the United States
and no appropriate disposal capacity in Canada." Id. at 11101.
140. 15 U.s.C. §2605(e)(3)(B). The Administrator may only grant such an exemption if there will be no "unreasonable risk of injury to health or environment" and "good
faith efforts have been made to develop a chemical substance which does not present
an unreasonable risk ofiJ:Uury to health and the environment and which may be substituted for such [PCBI." 15 U.S.C. §2605(e)(3)(B)(i)(ii).
141. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal,
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18,1996).
142. Environmental concerns must be addressed before Canada permits PCB waste
exports, ES&E, May 1996, <http://www.esemag.com/0596lpcb.html> (on fIle with
author) (hereinafter "ES&E").
143. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22,1989, UN Doc. UNEPIIG.80/3, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989)
(entered into force May 5,1992) (hereinafter "Basel Convention").
144. The Basel Convention requires Parties to prohibit the export of hazardous
wastes, including PCBs, if they have "reason to believe that the wastes in question will
not be managed in an environmentally sound manner." Id. art. 4.2(e) (prohibition),
Annex 1 (listing PCBs). In addition, Parties may not export PCBs to non-Parties, id.
art. 4.5, unless they enter into an arrangement or agreement that does not "derogate
from the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes" as required by the
Convention. Id. art. 11.1. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Basel
Convention.
145. Export and Import of Hazardous Waste Regulations, S0R/92-637, P.C. 19922284, Nov. 12, 1992. The regulations prohibit the export of hazardous wastes to countries that are not party to the Basel Convention or the Canada-U.S.A. Agreement on
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste. Id. art. 6(c).
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to amend its PCB regulations to allow limited transhoundary
trade in PCB wastes beginning in mid-1996. 146
In October 1995, the United States granted SD Myers "enforcement discretion" to begin importing Canadian PCBs the
following month. 147 The following month, Canada temporarily
banned the export of PCBs to the United States because Canada was "uncertain about the fmal contents of the U.S. regulatory amendments governing PCB waste imports" and "lacked
assurance that Canadian PCB wastes, if exported to the U.S.,
would be managed in an environmentally sound manner."148
The ban was implemented pursuant to authority under .the
Canadian Environmental Protection Act to issue "interim orders," which
can be made if a substance deemed toxic under CEPA,
in this case PCBs, is not adequately regulated, and immediate action is required to deal with a significant
danger to the environment or to human life or health. 149

146. See EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Dis·
posal, 61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18, 1996). In particular, instead of requiring persons
wishing to import PCBs for disposal to apply for a case·by-case exemption, importers
would only have been required to provide EPA notice of the importation of PCBs 45
days prior to the intended importation date. Id. at 11097, 11107.
147. ES&E, supra note 142.
148. Id. Canada's PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, explain the concern reo
garding PCBs:
Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are very stable substances; they
are resistant to chemical and physical degradation. They are also
persistent and bioaccumulate in living organisms and are capable of
penetrating the food chain. Consequently, PCBs have been listed in
Schedule I of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) as
toxic. Furthermore, once released into the atmosphere, PCBs can
travel extremely long distances. As a result, they are regularly
found in the Great Lakes Region and also in remote area such as the
Arctic.
Canadian Dept. of Env't, PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement, <http://www.hazmatmag.comllibraryIPCBRegs96IPCBRegs96e.
html> (on file with author) (hereinafter "Waste Export Regs. Impact Statementn).
149. CEPA, supra note 119, Chapt. 16, § 15.3 (1985), Interim Orders 35. Once an
Interim Order is made, it can only remain in effect if the minister issuing the order
"offerlsl to consult with the governments of all affected provinces within twenty-four
hours after making the Order to determine whether they are prepared to deal with the
significant dangern and "consultlsl with other Ministers of the Crown to determine
whether any action can be taken under any other Act of Parliament to deal with the
significant danger.n Id. The Interim Order banning PCB waste exports to the United
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In February 1996, the Canadian Ministers of the Environment and Health announced that the ban would remain in
place until Canada was assured that PCB wastes exported to
the United States would be treated appropriately.l50 Canada's
concern regarding PCB treatment was explained in subsequent
legislation lifting the ban:
Landfilling does not destroy PCBs, consequently, the potential for future environmental contamination continues. In addition, landfilling requires maintenance and
monitoring in perpetuity. If Canadian PCB wastes are
allowed to be landfilled in the United States, they could
escape into the environment and, because of their capacity to volatilize and to be transported over long distances, they could affect the health of Canadians and
Canadian's [sic] environment as well as that of other
countries. Furthermore, as a party to the Basel Convention, Canada is required to ensure that any exports
of hazardous wastes, including PCB wastes, be disposed
of in an environmentally sound manner. Since guidelines adopted by Parties of the Basel Convention do not
consider landfilling of PCB wastes to be environmentally sound, Canada has an obligation to ensure that
Canadian PCB wastes are not exported for landfilling in
the United States. 151
In March 1996, the United States issued new regulations
governing the import of PCB wastes. 152 After reviewing the
regulations, Canada rescinded its ban, allowing exports of PCB
wastes "for treatment and destruction but not for landfilling,"
beginning in February 1997. 153 The Canadian Ministry of the
Environment explained that the new regulations would allow
PCB waste exports to the United States

States was entitled Regulations Amending the PCB Waste Export Regulations (Interim
Order). See PCB Waste Export Regulations, 1996, Description, <http://www.
hazmatmag.com/libraryIPCBRegs96IPCBRegs96e.html> (on file with author).
150. ES&E, supra note 142.
151. Waste Export Regs. Impact Statement, supra note 148.
152. EPA Final Rule, Disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls; Import for Disposal,
61 Fed. Reg. 11096 (Mar. 18,1996).
153. Waste Export Regs. Impact Statement, supra note 148.
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only if the Department of the Environment has the
guarantee that: these wastes will be treated and destroyed in an efficient and environmentally sound manner; and, the U.S. EPA has been informed and has accepted that these PCB wastes enter that country.
Therefore, as mentioned in the news release by both
Ministers, the Regulations will allow exports of Canadian PCB wastes and these wastes will be allowed only
for treatment and destruction and thus ensuring that
any export of Canadian PCB wastes will be managed in
an environmentally sound manner. 1M
In addition to the direct effect of ensuring safe disposal of
PCB wastes, Canada noted that lifting the export ban had significant other environmental and economic benefits. These
included decreased risk of exposure to PCB wastes due to
shorter transport distances for wastes located near disposal
facilities in the United States; lowered cost of PCB waste disposal due to increased competitiveness among a larger number
of available disposal facilities and shorter transportation distances; and increased destruction of PCBs due to the lowered
cost, resulting in less likelihood of exposure and less storage
and cleanup expenses. 1M In July 1997, a U.S. Court of Appeals
overturned EPA's new import regulations, ruling that EPA was
bound by U.S. law to consider individual exemption applications on a case-by-case basis. 156
SD Myers's NAFTA claim is apparently based on contracts
that it had with a group of Canadian companies to dispose of
their PCB wastes. 157 The company alleged that the ban gave "a
monopoly on PCB treatment to an Alberta company."I58

154. [d.
155. [d.
156. Sierra Club v. EPA, U8 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997).
157. See InterPress Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.
158. Greenwire, Aug. 24, 1998, at 2 (citing JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, 8t24). According to SD Myers's attorney, the Canadian ban "hurt S.D. Myers Inc. simply because it
was an American company." InterPress Service, Sept. 23, 1998, at 4.
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v.

INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The question at the heart of this Article is one of international law - specifically, whether international law protects
the right of governments to implement environmental measures that affect property interests without becoming obligated
to compensate for those effects. Despite the international nature of the question, the Article will fust briefly describe U.S.,
Canadian and Mexican law regarding regulatory takings. It
will do so for a number of reasons.
First, whereas relatively few international tribunals have
considered whether regulations affecting the value of property
give rise to an obligation to compensate, U.S. courts have considered the question in some detail. Canadian courts have also
addressed the issue, although less frequently. U.S. law is also
likely to have a strong influence on the development of international law in this area, because, as one of the leading capitalexporting states, it "will contend for the transference of the system of property protection in [its] domestic sphere onto the international sphere. "159 Canada and Mexico have similar motivation, although widely differing ability, to make international
law reflect their systems. In addition, domestic laws help to
define "general principles of law," which are one of the sources
of international law. 160
Conversely, international law concerning regulatory expropriation could have a strong effect on the ability of the United
States to regulate to protect the environment or other important societal concerns. In the famous words of the U.S. Supreme Court, " [i]nternationallaw is part of our law."161 More
importantly, however, as a party to numerous agreements

159. M. SORNARAJAH. THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 294
(1994). Sornarajah notes that "[t]here is evidence of such a transference in the past"
and that "[t]he pervasive influence of the American jurisprudence on the taking of
property is evident in modern discussions on taking in international law." [d. The
United States intends that the expropriation standards in the MAl will be "consistent
with U.S. legal principles and practice." Larson Testimony, supra note 15.
160. See infra note 241.
161. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677. 700 (1900).
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regulating expropriation, including the NAFrA, and a promoter of the globalization of these rules, the U.S. government
and its citizens must be aware of the degree to which internationallaw may support or conflict with U.S. law. If, for example, international law and agreements were to require compensation for a wide variety of environmental regulations - a position already advanced by a number of companies seeking to
use the NAFTA to obtain compensation for the impact of laws
on their investments - the ability of the United States to protect its environment could be profoundly limited. 162 The same
is true for Canada, Mexico and all other countries of the world.
A.

REGULATORY TAKINGS UNDER DOMESTIC LAw

The U.S., Canadian and Mexican legal systems provide
varying degrees of protection to private property. Nevertheless, as the following descriptions demonstrate, they share a
common understanding that the government is not obligated to
compensate for the economic impact of most legitimate regulatory action.

1.

Regulatory Takings Under U.S. Law

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees
that private property shall not "be taken for public use without
just compensation. "163 Until 1922, the Supreme Court had considered that the Constitutional requirement of compensation
applied only to direct takings - those in which the government
took full title to private property.l64 In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, the Court first recognized what have been called
"regulatory takings," stating that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."I65 The Court has been less than clear,

162. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 299 ("If, each time there is a [regulatory]
measure against a foreign investor, he could allege a taking in international law which
needs to be compensated, regulatory measures against foreign investors could become
impossible.").
163. US. Const. amend. V.
164. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 500 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
165. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The distinction between a direct taking and a regu·
latory taking is still relevant: "A 'taking', may more readily be found when the interfer·
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however, in defining what is "too far." Rather than establishing a definitive test for when a regulation becomes a taking,l66
the Court has determined that the analysis depends on an "ad
hoc, factual inquir[y] into the circumstances of each particular
case,"167 and has identified three factors that are particularly
significant in undertaking this inquiry.l68 Although these three
factors must be applied on a case-by-case basis, one scholar has
noted that "it is quite difficult to establish a [regulatory] taking
under [the Court's] ad hoc approach, in part [because of] the
sensitivity of the courts to the important purposes of government regulation and the reciprocal advantages of economic
regulation. "169
The first factor in the Supreme Court's regulatory taking
analysis is "the nature of the governmental action. "170 Regulations that cause the government to "physically invade or permanently appropriate"l7l the property in question automatically require compensation "no matter how minute the intrusion, an'" no matter how weighty the public purpose behind
it."172 Lesser interference, on the other hand, that "arises from
a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life economic life to promote the common good ... does
not constitute a taking requiring Government compensation."173

ence with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government ... than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good." Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
166. See Lucas,505 U.S. at 1015 (Court has "generally eschewed any set formula
for determining how far is too far, preferring to engage in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries" (quotations omitted».
167. Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calif. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 643 (1993) (quotation omitted).
168. [d.
169. Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Leg·
islation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187,203 (1997).
170. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643.
171. [d.; Connolly v. Trustees of the Operating Engineers Pension Trust, 475 U.S.
211, at 225 (1986).
172. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
173. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643. See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 ("IGlovernment may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation
without incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge
explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police power"); Connolly, 475 U.S.
at 225; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (where the State "reasonably conclude lsI that 'the
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As the Court has explained, "such restrictions are the burdens

we must all bear in exchange for the advantage of living and
doing business in a civilized community."174
Regulations also must "substantially advance legitimate
state interests. "175 The Supreme Court has recognized as legitimate, and thus not requiring compensation, regulations addressing a host of environmental or human health problems. 176
These have included regulations prohibiting smoke
emissions; 177 requiring the construction of roadside flood-control
devices;178 limiting the size of buildings to "avoid unnecessary
conversion of open space land to strictly urban areas, thereby
protecting against the resultant adverse impacts such as air,
noise, and water pollution, ... disturbance of the ecology and
the environment, ... and other demonstrated consequences of
urban sprawl";179 prohibiting the sale of items made from endangered species; ISO regulating the sale and use of peBticides; 181
banning the import of baitfish from other states to protect native fish from exogenous parasites; 182 requiring the destruction
of diseased trees to protect local orchards; 183 banning brickyard
operations in a residential area because of their adverse impacts on human health; 184 restricting coal mining activities to

health, safety, morals, or general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular
contemplated uses of land," compensation need not accompany prohibition).
174. Ruckelshaus v. Mansanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (quotation omitted).
175. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015·17 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
176. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 (There exists "a long line of this Court's cases sus·
taining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the State's use of its 'police
powers' to enjoin a property owner from activities akin to public nuisances" (citations
omitted)).
177. See Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916) (no valid con·
stitutional objection in fact that regulation "may require the discontinuance of the use
of property, or subject the occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the
law").
178. See Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranberger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915).
179. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262 (zoning regulation limiting buildings to single-family
dwellings, accessory buildings, and open-spaces uses substantially advanced the cited
interests).
180. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (refusing to require compensation when a ban on the sale of eagle feathers made it impossible for the claimant to sell
certain items he had intended to sell).
181. See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007.
182. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
183. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (due process challenge).
184. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.s. 394,410-11 (1915).
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protect the environment and public welfare; 185 regulating or
banning the manufacture or sale of alcoholic beverages to protect "public health, public morals, and the public safety"; 186 and
protecting visual access to the ocean. 187
The second factor that the Supreme Court has identified in
considering whether a regulatory taking requires compensation
is "the severity of the economic impact" of the governmental
action. l88 The Court has stated that a regulation will usually
constitute a compensable taking if it "denies all economically
beneficial or productive use" of the property in question. 189 On
the other hand, "mere diminution in the value of property,
however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking. "190

185. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
295 (1981) (statute prohibiting mining near certain locations and regulating conditions
under which any mining could be conducted did not constitute a taking because it did
not prevent any non·mining uses of land); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Ben·
dictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (statute designed to prevent ground surface from collapsing was warranted in interest of public safety).
186. Mugler v. Kansas, 1923 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887). See also Everard's Breweries
v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 563 (1924) (law banning sale of certain beverages already existing
at time ofact); Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 303 (1920) (same).
187. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). Although
the Court found the interest advanced to be legitimate, it concluded that conditioning a
building permit on the grant of a public easement to provide physical access to the
beach did not satisfy the "essential nexus" requirement. [d. at 837. The Court has
used this requirement where land development permits are conditioned on granting
public easements, stating that in such cases there must be an "essential nexus" and a
"rough proportionality" between the interest and the conditions· imposed by the regulation. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). When the regulation does
not require a public easement on private property, the Court has not applied the essential nexus requirement. See Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578-79 (1995)
(noting that "KEystone [480 U.S. at 4901-decided in the same year as Nollan-downplayed the need for any nexus requirement in considering the constitutionality of a
general regulation and focused on the need for a legitimate police power justification").
188. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645.
189. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-19 (emphasis added).
190. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 643 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (approximately 75% diminution in value); Hadacheck, 239
U.S. 394 (finding that a ban on brickyard plant operations was not a taking because it
was intended to protect human health even when the ban reduced the value of plaintift's property from $2 million to $100,000 (92.5% diminution»). See also Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1019 n.8 ("It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will
get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full."); Andrus, 444 U.S.
at 66 (although the regulation prevented "the most profitable use of [claimant'sl property," it did not prevent all use); Haas v. City & County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d
1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (diminution in value from $2 million to $100,000 not a tak-
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It is important to note that the Court has repeatedly held
that it must analyze the impact of a regulation on the property
as a whole. "At least where an owner possesses a full 'bWldle'
of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bWldle
is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety. "191 Thus, in Keystone, the Court rejected the argument that a regulation prohibiting the removal of more than
50% of the coal beneath certain structures constituted a taking
of the Wlremoved coal. 192

The fmal factor identified by the Supreme Court in considering whether a regulation effects a compensable taking is the
degree to which the regulation interferes with the claimant's
"reasonable investment-backed expectations. "193 Thus, for example, the owner of property used in an activity already subject to extensive regulation has no reasonable expectation that
new or changed regulations will not affect the value of that
property. 194 A property owner "necessarily expects the uses of

ing). Even where a regulation has removed all economically beneficial use, the Court
has refused to require compensation if the owner had no reasonable investment·backed
expectation of being able to make that use of the property. See infra, text accompany·
ing notes 193-196.
191. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. In Concrete Pipe, the Court stated: "To the extent
that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the
relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of,
the parcel in question." 508 U.S. at 644 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-32 ("[A)
claimant's parcel of property [cannot] first be divided into what was .tak.en and what
was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and
hence compensable")).
192. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497-98 (1987).
193. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 (quotation omitted). This factor is sometimes
considered as a threshold question regarding whether the property interest at issue
ever included the right to use the property in the manner prohibited by the regulation-ifthere is no such use interest, the regulation cannot be a taking. See, e.g., M&J
Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1153·54 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court
applied the test in this manner in Lucas. See 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing majority's consideration of the "nature of the owner's estate" as
a test of "whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations").
194. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645 ("[L]egislation readjusting rights and
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations ... even
though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past
acts"; "those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative
scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end" (quotations omitted; citing numerous cases)); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007, 1009 (pesticide
sale and use is an area that "has long been the source of public concern and the subject
of government regulation"; no reasonable expectation of confidentiality because the
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his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of
its police powers."195 Moreover, it is reasonable for an investor
to expect legislation that imposes an economic burden in the
form of liability for past harm caused by the investor, "whether
or not the cost was foreseen at the time" the harm was
caused. 196
Even a regulation prohibiting all economically beneficial use
may not require compensation if "the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with. "197
In this respect, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
personal and real property. Regarding personal property, the
Court has stated that "by reason of the State's traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings, [the property
owner] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation
might even render his property economically worthless (at least

chemical industry has historically been "a focus of great public concern and significant
government regulation" such that there was a substantial possibility that the Federal
Government "would find disclosure to be in the public interest.").
195. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hemstead, 369 U.S.
590, 593 (1962) ("A prohibition simply on the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit.").
196. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (1998). In Eastern Enterprises, the Court held unconstitutional a law requiring a company to pay benefits to
retired coal miners and their dependents, despite the fact that the company had not
been in the coal business in approximately 30 years. A plurality opinion found the law
to violate the Takings Clause because it "single[d) out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers' conduct far in the past, and
unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused."
[d. at 2153. The plurality distinguished the case from other cases, however, because
the coal law was "not calibrated either to [the claimant's) past actions or to any agreement-implicit or otherwise-by the company," id. at 2152 (citing Concrete Pipe and
Connolly), and did not "merely impose liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the
past [that) is justified as a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor:" [d. (quoting Usury
v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. I, 18 (1976)). The plurality further stated that the claimant in Eastern Enterprises "might be responsible for employment-related health problems of all former employees whether or not the cost was foreseen at the time of employment," but noted that the law at issue did not make any such connection. [d. at
2153.
197. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
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if the property's only economically productive use is sale or
manufacture for sale)."198
Regarding regulations affecting land, the Court would require compensation when a regulation prohibits all economically beneficial use unless the regulation simply implemented a
restriction that already existed in "the background principles of
the State's law of property and nuisance."I99 Thus, for example,
the Court stated that the owner of a lakebed could be denied a
permit to engage in a landfilling operation that would cause
flooding in others' land without the denial, giving rise to a right
to compensation. 2°O Nor would the corporate owner of a nuclear
generating plant have a right to compensation if the state directed it to "remove all facilities from its land upon discovery
that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault. "201 This special
requirement is probably limited to land-use regulations that
prohibit all economically beneficial use. In light of the Court's
consideration of the economic impact of the regulation, 202
whether a regulation affecting land implements a preexisting

198. [d. at 1027·28.
199. [d. at 1029. "A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adja.
cent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect
the public generally, or otherwise." [d.
200. [d. at 1030.
201. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030. The Court explained that:
such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the land's only
economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that
was previously permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles.
The use of these properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes
was always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it was
open to the State at any point to make the implication of those background
principles of nuisan~e and property law explicit.
[d. at 1029·30. A federal court of appeals directly addressed the Supreme Court's sec·
ond hypothetical. rejecting a compensation claim based on the government's failure to
issue an operating permit for a plutonium recycling plant, even though the government
had actively promoted and induced the claimant's expenditure of over $200 million to
build the plant and had led the claimant to expect the permit before changing course
and denying the permit. Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States .. 839 F.2d
1572 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.s. 819 (1988). The court explained that "the basic
rule that is dispositive here is that as against reasonable state regulation, no one has a
legally protected right to use property in a manner that is injurious to the safety of the
general public." [d. at 1576.
202. See supra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
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regulation should be less important if the regulation leaves
some economically beneficial use of the property. 203
Applying the analysis required by the Supreme Court, lower
courts of the United States have rejected compensation claims
arising out of a wide range of laws protecting the environment
or human health, including, among many others, laws requiring the clean-up of harmful commercial byproducts 204 or other
hazardous materials/05 limiting harmful air emissions;206 restricting the sale and transport of endangered species;207 restricting the right to hunt particular animals on private land;208
requiring the destruction of abandoned buildings;209 and prohibiting the exploitation of natural resources on private property for reasons of public health, safety and welfare. 210

203. As Justice Kennedy stated in his concurring opinion in Lucas:
the State should not be prevented from enacting new regulatory initiatives in
response to changing conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations whatever their source.... Coastal property may present such
unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in
regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might
otherwise permit.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf Miller, 276 U.S. at 280 (in considering due process challenge to order requiring destruction of diseased trees, Court
"need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they may be so declared by statute.
For where, as here, the choice is unavoidable, we cannot say that its exercise, controlled by considerations of social policy which are not unreasonable, involves any
denial of due process").
204. See, e.g., Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (law requiring uranium producers to clean up hazardous mill tailings not require compensation, even though the cleanup cost will be greater than the value of the mill and the
government had encouraged the companies to produce the uranium).
205. See, e.g., Kaufman v. City of New York, 717 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (law
requiring removal of asbestos from office buildings not a taking, despite fact that city
had previously approved asbestos for fireproofing); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting takings claim based on retroactive application of US Superfund law requiring claimant to pay cleanup costs).
206. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976), vacated
and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislation, 434 U.S. 809
(1977).

207. See, e.g., United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976).
208. See, e.g., Clajon, 70 F.3d at 1566 (lOth Cir. 1995) (limiting hunting licenses to
two per landowner, regardless of size of property, not a taking).
209. See, e.g., Hoeck v. City of Portland, 57 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995).
210. See, e.g., MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984) (denial of timber harvest permit does not deny all economically viable use of property,
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2.

Regulatory Takings Under Canadian Law

Canadian courts have generally refused to require compensation for the loss of property value caused by a legitimate government regulation unless the regulation actually transfers a
benefit from the original owner to the government. 211 This
treatment arises out of the Canadian constitutional regime,
pursuant to which
the provisional Legislatures ... probably have a general
power to expropriate property in the province, simply by
virtue of their legislative power over "property and civil
rights in the province." The constitutional changes of
1982 put important restraints on the freedom of action
of both the federal and provisional governments in the
field of civil rights. But, they did not impose rights
comparable to those of American constitutional law in
favour of the owners of property. The Canadian Charter
of Rights, section 7, assures that "everyone has the right
to life, liberty and security of the person ... ," but it does
not go on, as do the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution with respect to the
powers of Congress or the States, to assure the light to
"property.'J212

despite claim that harvest is only profitable use); SUCN Suarez v. Gelabert, 541 F.
Supp. 1253 (D. Puerto Rico 1982) (denial of sand extraction permit not a taking).
211. See PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 28-10 (1997) ("Where a
statute is regulatory, not involving a taking of property, the general rule is that no
compensation is payable for loss caused by the statute."). See also Michelle Swenarchuk, Stomping on the Earth: Trade, Trade Law, and Canada's Ecological Footprints,
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 211 (1998) ("Canadian law maintains the principle that legislatures may legitimately regulate property use in the public interest, without having to
pay compensation if the measures are undertaken in good faith and do not involve a
change in title.").
212. Donald S. Macdonald, Sovereignty Revisited: Chapter 11 of NAFTA- What Are
the Implications for Sovereignty?, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 281, 282 (1998) (quoting PETER W.
HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADA 396 (Carwell, Toronto, 2d ed. 1995) (citing
Canadian Constitution § 92(13»; Constitution Act of 1982, Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms § 7). See also A&L Investments Ltd. v. Ontario, [1997) D.L.RAth 692,
702 ("[T)he jurisprudence that has developed under the Charter [of Rights and Freedoms) has made clear that economic rights as generally encompassed by the term
'property' and the economic right to carryon a business, to earn a particular livelihood,
or to engage in a particular professional activity all fall outside the s. 7 guarantee."
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Under this scheme, "an aggrieved landowner must be able
to demonstrate that not only has property been taken, but that
the taking has also benefited the expropriating authority."213

In a recent case applying this principle, the Ontario Court of
Appeal considered a claim that a law voiding previously-issued
government orders permitting landlords to increase rents constituted a taking of the landlords' property rights. 214 The court
first noted that Canadian law applies a presumption pursuant
to which "unless the words of the statute clearly so demand, a
statute is not to be construed so as to take away the property of
a subject without compensation. "215 After reviewing several
cases, the court concluded that "for the presumption of compensation to apply, ... the legislation must create what is in
essence an expropriation of the plaintiffs property by the state.
The state must acquire the property taken from the plaintiff
either for its own use or for the purpose of destruction. "216 Regarding the claim before it, the court denied the compensation
claim, holding that,
[w]hile the property rights of the plaintiffs voided by the
[law] may, in one sense, be said to have been taken from
the plaintiffs, in no sense can they be said to have been
acquired by the Crown ....
The [law] is not an act of expropriation by the Crown.
Rather, it is an exercise of its regulatory authority.

(Citations omitted». HOGG, supra note 211, at 28-11 ("In Canada, ... neither the Constitution Act, 1867 nor the Charter of Rights contains any guarantee of compensation
and, in the absence of any such guarantee, legislative power is unlimited. The position
was accurately, if dramatically, put by the judge who said that 'the prohibition "Thou
shalt not steal" has no force upon the sovereign body.'" (Citations and quotation omitted.».
213. Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 208; see also id. (Under Canadian law "the
term 'expropriation' traditionally refers to a landowner's loss of use, title or benefit of
property and a transfer of the value of use, title or benefit to a public authority."); See
also Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener [1985]17 D.L.RAth 1,6 ("Expropriation or compulsory taking occurs if the Crown or a public authority acquires from the
owner an interest in property"). See also A&L Investments, 152 D.L.R.4th 692.
214. A&L Investments, 152 D.L.RAth at 695-696.
215. Id. at 698-699 (quotation omitted).
216. Id. at 700 (citing Steer Holdings Ltd. v. Government of Manitoba [1993] 2
W.W.R. 146 (Man. C.A.); Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel [1920] A.C. 508;
Burma Oil Co. Ltd. v. Lord Advocate [1965] A.C. 75 (H.L.».
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There is no principle of statutory interpretation that
would presume that those adversely affected by a statute regulating their affairs are entitled to compensation
unless the statute says otherwise. No policy basis is
readily apparent for such a rule. Indeed, such a principle would severely hamper the operation of the modem
state where most regulatory legislation, however remedial, adversely affects someone. Moreover, if regulatory
legislation voiding but not expropriating property rights
triggered a presumed right to compensation from the
state, the effect would be to give property rights the
equivalent of the protection accorded by s. 7 of the Charter despite the clear exclusion of such rights from the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms by its drafters. In
other words, an individual would have the right not to
be deprived of his property by regulatory legislation except with compensation or with an explicit override of
that right by legislative language. 217
Canadian courts have applied these principles to uphold
regulations even when the regulations have prohibited all effective use of the property in question. For example, in Hartel
Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Council of the City of Calgary, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to require compensation when
a law freezing development had removed all economically viable use of the claimant's land. 218 Because the city's actions
were "taken pursuant to a legitimate and valid planning purpose, ... the resulting detriment' to the appellant is one that

217. [d. at 701. The Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that the requirement
of transfer to the government removes most regulatory actions from the category of
expropriation requiring compensation. In Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 12, described infra
text accompanying note8 222 - 226, the Court distinguished zoning regulations and the
regulation of activities on lands, which "add nothing to the value of public property,"
from takings that enhance the value of government assets.
On the other hand, when a regulation does transfer the property in question to the
government, Canadian courts have not hesitated to require compensation. For example, in Manitoba Fisheries Ltd. v. The Queen [1975] 88 D.L.R.3d 462, the Supreme
Court of Canada upheld a compensation claim brought by the owner of' a fish marketing corporation that had been put out of business when a Canadian law gave a monopoly in fish marketing to a government corporation. The Court based its conclusion on
the fact that the law had transferred the claimant's business to the government. [d. at
469-71.
218. [1984] 8 D.L.R.4th 321.
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must be endured in the public interest."219 Similarly, in La
Ferme Filiber Ltee v. The Queen,220 the court refused to require
compensation to a claimant who was forced to shut down his
trout-hatching enterprise, for which he had held an operating
license for five years, because of a law prohibiting the operation
of such hatcheries in the area. 221 The court's decision was
based on the fact that, although the claimant's rights were extinguished, the regulation had not transferred any property
interest to the government. 222 .
Some Canadian cases have also distinguished between real
and personal property, generally giving broad leeway to the
government to regulate without incurring an obligation to
compensate for the effects of the regulation on the value of personal property.223 This distinction is clear in two cases consid-

219. [d. at 334. See also Soo Mill & Lumber Co. v. City of Sault Ste-Marie [1975] 2
Can. S.C.R. 78, 83 (upholding zoning regulation that "sterilized [the claimant's land] in
respect of any effective use," because development freezes not prohibited if enacted in
accordance with the purpose of municipal plans or zoning regulations); Sanbay Developments Ltd. v. City of London [1975] 45 D.L.R.3d 403 (refusing to invalidate zoning
regulation that froze development of claimant's land). Scholars have stated that the
principle underlying Soo Mill, Sanbay and Hartel Holdings is that "planning authorities may regulate, restrict or prohibit land use or development without triggering the
remedy of compensation for affected landowners, providing that such measures are
undertaken in good faith for a proper planning purpose." RICHARD LINDGREN & KAREN
CLARK, PROPERTY RIGHTS VS. LAND USE REGULATION: DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF
"EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION" 5-8 (Canadian Envtl. L. Ass'n 1994) (quoted
in Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 210-11). See also Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at
208-09 ("Canadian courts have long recognized that land use regulation is not "expropriation," primarily because zoning by-laws [regulations] or other planning instruments do not generally involve a taking or transfer of the full use, title or benefit of
property. Therefore, if a landowner's ability to use or develop his or her property is
constrained by a properly enacted zoning by-law, the landowner is not entitled to compensation, even if the zoning by-law causes a diminution in property value.").
220. [1997]1 F.C. 128.
221. [d. at 128-29.
222. [d. at 130 ("An expropriation implies dispossession of the expropriated party
and appropriation by the expropriating party; it net:essarily requires a transfer of
property or rights from one party to the other. There is nothing of that kind here.
Defendant has not acquired anything belonging to plaintiff.").
223. See Swenarchuk, supra note 211, at 208 ("In Canada, the issue of expropriation generally arises in relation to real estate, not other forms of property"). The distinction between real and personal property has not been absolute. For example, in
Manitoba Fisheries v. The Queen [1978] 1 S.C.R. 101, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that the owner of a pre-existing private fish exporting business had a right to
compensation for loss of the business's goodwill after a federal statute put him out of
business by giving a government corporation the exclusive right to export fish.
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ering compensation claims arising out of the loss of property
resulting from laws designating certain land as public parks. 224
In each case, the claimant held rights related to the exploitation of subsurface minerals within the designated land and the.
designation prohibited mineral exploration and extraction. 225
In Queen in Right of British Columbia v. Tener, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the claimant was entitled to compensation, relying on the fact that the property taken by the
regulation, which included the right of access to the claim area,
was a real property interest. 226 In Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v.
British Columbia, however, the court refused to follow the Tener decision and denied compensation, stating that although
the claimant's mining claim was rendered useless, it; was "material" that the interest at issue was not an interest in land. 227

3.

Regulatory Takings Under Mexican Law
Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution provides:
Ownership of the lands and waters within the
boundaries of the national territory is vested originally
in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to
transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property.
Private property shall not be expropriated except for
reasons of public use and subject to payment of indemnity.

224. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 5; Cream Silver Mines Ltd. v. British Columbia [1993)
99 D.L.R.4th 199, 205.
225. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 3, 5; Cream Silver Mines, 99 D.L.R.4th at 205.
226. Tener, 17 D.L.R.4th at 3 (claimant's grant entitled it to "all [subsurface) minerals ... and the right to the use and possession of the surface of such mineral claim ...
for the purpose of winning and getting from and out of such claim the minerals contained therein"). See also id. at 6 (grant was interest in land). The Court also noted
that the denial of access to the park lands enhanced the value of the government's
asset (the park). See id. at 12.
227. Cream Silver, 99 D.L.R.4th at 202, 205-206 (as opposed to the Crown grant at
issue in Tener, this is simply a mineral claim; there has never been any absolute right
of access to the claim area to obtain the ore, the government has power to refuse to
grant right of way, and such claims "have never been capable of registration under the
... system ofland regulation").
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The Nation shall at all times have the right to impose
on private property rights the limitations dictated by
the public interest, as well as to regulate, for the collective good, the use of natural resources susceptible to appropriation, to ensure a more equitable distribution of
public wealth, to conserve them, to achieve the wellbalanced development of the country and the improvement of the living conditions of the rural and urban
population.228 .
This provision clearly distinguishes between expropriation
-which, under Mexican law, consists of "legally taking a thing
from its owner, for reasons of public utility, and giving the
owner a fair indemnification"229-and the limitations (modalidades) referred to in the third paragraph, which do not require
indemnification even though they may affect the value of property.230 The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice has explained

228. Const. of Mexico, Tit. I, Chap. I, art. 27, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD (Apr. 1988 & Supp. June 1998).
The Constitution also conditions the right of foreigners to own "lands, waters, and
their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or waters"
on the foreigners' agreement that they will ·consider themselves as nationals in respect
to such property and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their governments
in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the acquired property to the Nation." Id., art. 27.1 (Supp. June
1998). This provision is a codification of the "Calvo Doctrine" regarding expropriation,
which is followed by most Latin American nations. See Justine Daly, Has Mexico
Crossed the &rder on State Responsibility for Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico After NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY L.J. 1147, 1150,
1163-65 (1994). The United States has consistently rejected the Calvo Doctrine as a
basis for the treatment offoreign investment. See id. at 1166-71.
229. JUAN JOSE GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, NUEVO DERECHO AMBIENTAL MEXICANO
(INSTRUMENTOS DE POLiTICA) 154 (Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana 1997)
(translations by author) (quoting Monique Lions, Expropiaci6n, in Instituto de Investigaciones Jur£dicos, DICCIONARIO Jurumco MEXICANO 1389 (Mexico, POrrUa-UNAM
1992). See also GABINO FRAGA, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO 375-76 (Mexico 1984)
(translations by author) ("in the case of expropriation an individual is deprived of his or
her goods inasmuch as this is necessary for the state").
230. See FRAGA, supra note 229, at 375-76 ("Expropriation for reasons of public
value is to be distinguished from the limitations that the State may impose on private
property for reasons of public interest (Art. 27, para. III, Federal Const.)). In the words
of one Mexican legal scholar,
[t]he right to property [under the Mexican Constitution] is not an absolute
right, but is a right that serves a social function, and therefore, in Article 27 ...
the Nation is empowered to limit the exercise of that right. [Article 27] signifies that private property is of a derivative character and as a result the nation
may impose limitations on it.
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that these latter limitations constitute "a partial extinction of
the rights of the owner," whereas
expropriation amounts to the substitution of the right to
use and ownership of the thing for the enjoyment of the
indemnity. Regarding the former llimitations], the suppression of the partial authority of the owner occurs
without any consideration; regarding the latter, the
damage caused is compensated through the payment of
the value of the rights lost.23\
Limitations that do not require indemnification must be
generally applicable, rather than specifically directed at an
identified piece of property, and must remove only limited attributes of the owner's right to the property, rather than transferring to the State ownership of the property. 232 Using these
criteria, the Mexican Supreme Court has not required indemnification for the effects of regulations prohibiting a general category of activities in certain types of locations, such as regulations prohibiting the construction of ovens, chimneys or certain
other potentially hazardous structures less than a prescribed
distance from the property of another.233 Another example of
property limitations that do not require indemnification are
decrees, issued pursuant to the General Law of Ecological Balance, limiting the use of property within natural protected ar-

GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, supra note 229, at 152-53.
231. [Supreme Court of Justice Report] 1980, Pleno tesis 29, at 543 (quoted in
FRAGA, supra note 229, at 376-77).
232. Gonzalez Marquez, supra 228, at 156-58 (citing Mexican Supreme Court of
Justice, Septima Epoca, Primera Parte: Volumenes 133-38, 155. Amparo en revisi6n
6408nS. Maria Fortes de Lamas, 18 Mar. 1980). See also Supreme Court of Justice
Report 1980, supra note 231 (limitations "suppose a general and permanent restriction
on the property right; [expropriation] implies the transfer of the rights over a specific
good through the intervention of the state"); FRAGA, supra note 229, at 375-76
("[T]here are differences of form and substance between limitations and expropriation.
The former is a measure of general and abstract character that is part of and shapes,
but does not transform, the legal regime regarding the general ownership of property
in a given time and place. Expropriation, on the other hand, constitutes a measure of
individual and specific character whose effects are concentrated on a specific property.").
233. GoNzALEZ MARQUEZ, supra note 229, at 165-66 (citing unanimous decision of
Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, Tomo CXL, at 1918. Amparo civil en revisi6n
943148. Diaz de Garza Consuelo, 14 Mar. 1952).
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eas.234 Because these regulations do not remove all of the
owner's rights in the property, and are of general application,
they do not require compensation.

B.

INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw

International law addresses the takings issue under the rubric of "expropriation" - which is "a compulsory transfer of
property rights"235 - and refers to regulatory takings as "indirect expropriation," "disguised expropriation" or "creeping expropriation. "236 Although a government must generally provide
compensation for expropriation,237 it is "an accepted principle of
international law that a State is not liable for economic injury
which is a consequence of bona fide 'regulation' within the accepted police power of states. »238 Thus, "anti-trust, consumer
protection, securities, environmental protection, land planning
and other legislation, are non-compensable takings. These

234. ld. at 161·62.
235. Amoco Int'l Fin. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 LL.M. 1320,
1342·43 (1988). The "paradigm" of direct expropriation consists of "an involuntary
transfer of ownership effected immediately by legislation in pursuance of state policy.
This results in the vesting of ownership of the property in the state or a state entity
created to run the industry that is taken over and the destruction of the rights of ownership of the foreign investors in the industry." SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 282.
236. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 282. One scholar rejects the phrase "creeping
expropriation" for fear that it "suggests a deliberate strategy on the part of the state,
which may imply a negative moral judgment." RudolfDolzer,lndirect Expropriation of
Alien Property, 1 ICSID REVIEW, FOREIGN INV. L.J. 41, 44 (1986).
237. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
712.
238. Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Interlocutory Award 9 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 248, 275 (1985). The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 712, cmt. g, states that a State need not provide compensation for
loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide
general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind
that is commonly accepted as within the police power of states, if it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to
the state or sell it at a distress price.
See also id. at reporter's note 6 ("It is often necessary to determine ... whether an action by a state constitutes a taking and requires compensation under international law,
or is a police power regulation or tax that does not give rise to an obligation to compensate even though a foreign national suffers loss as a consequence."); SORNARAJAH,
supra note 159, at 299 (1994) ("Obviously, infringements of property rights in controlling hazardous or environmentally sound use of property ... are regulatory takings that
require no compensation"; "It cannot be claimed by the citizens of these states that
compensation is due to them when there is such regulatory intervention.").
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regulations are regarded as essential to the efficient functioning of the state."239
Legal scholars have long affIrmed this principle. 240 The evidence supporting these scholarly pronouncements has generally consisted of the decisions of international courts and tribunals that have decided claims of expropriation. Although
international law generally recognizes judicial decisions as a
subsidiary source of internationallaw,241 and the principles of

239. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 283.
240. See, e.g., G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under Interna·
tional Law, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 331·32 (1962) ("[T)he operation of a State's tax
laws, changes in the value of a State's currency, actions in the interest of the public
health and morality, will all serve to justifY [i.e., remove from the category of expropriatory or compensable acts) actions which because of their severity would not otherwise be justifiable; subject to the proviso, of course, that the action in question is not
what would be commonly called discriminatory [with respect to aliens)."); S. FRIEDMAN,
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (1953) ("Indirect expropriation resulting from
the normal functioning of public services would not appear to give rise to any great
difficulty from the point of view of international law ."). See also, SORNARAJAH, supra
note 159, at 282-83 ("all measures affecting property rights" would not be an acceptable
definition of taking in international law "for the simple reason that normal activities of
states, such as taxation, affect property rights and cannot be expected to give rise to
international concern."); id. at 303 ("[T)he generally accepted view is that the exercise
of [the power to increase taxation) cannot be regarded as a taking in violation of property rights.").
241. As with any norm of international law, principles concerning expropriation derive from three primary sources. See Statute of the International Court of Justice,
June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1033, 1060. The most authoritative sources of
in~ernational legal obligations for a particular nation are found in international
agreements to which that nation is a party and customary international law, which
reflects state practice grounded in a belief that the practice is required by law. See id;
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §§ 102(1)-(4),
103(2) (1987). As noted above, note 22 and accompanying text, international agreements addressing indirect expropriation seldom define precisely what it is or when it
gives rise to an obligation to provide compensation. One U.S. government official has
stated that international investment agreements "do not generally call into question
the sovereign right of governments to regulate as long as regulation does not single out
or discriminate against investors based on their nationality." Larson Testimony, supra
note 15.
A secondary source of international law are "general principles oflaw common to the
countries of the world." ICJ Statute, supra, para. 1.d. In this regard, it is worth noting
that the constitutions of 19 nations make clear that governmental measures that affect
the value of property will not be considered compensable takings where those measures
are intended to protect human, animal or plant health, or (regarding taking of land) to
conserve soil or other natural resources. See CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Apr. 1997 & Supps.) (constitutions of Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Jamaica, Kenya, Malta, Mauritius, Papa New Guinea, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines, Tuvalu, Zambia, Zimbabwe). Such provisions, along with the consis-
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stare decisis does not formally apply to international
tribunals,242 the general lack of more authoritative sources addressing the limits of indirect expropriation gives such decisions a special legitimacy. 243
One of the most prolific interpreters of the international law
of expropriation has been the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, which
was established in 1981 to adjudicate claims by nationals of
each country against the government of the other. 244 In reviewing the Tribunal's decisions until 1994, one member of the

tent practice of national courts, which, with the exception of US, Canadian and Mexican practice, is beyond the scope of this Article, support the conclusion that international law does not require compensation for the economic effects of environmental
regulations.
Judicial decisions and the writings of scholars serve as "subsidiary means for the determination of rules oflaw." ICJ Statute, supra, para. l.d.
242. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides: "The
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of
that particular case." ICJ Statute, supra note 241, art. 59.
243. Modem tribunals deciding expropriation claims have "placed their principal
reliance on judicial and arbitral precedents." Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future
or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 474, 498 (1991). Norton notes several reasons for this phenomenon,
including a "natural predisposition of arbitrators toward the approach of their predecessors" and the legitimacy provided when a case is decided consistently with previous
analogous cases. Id. at 498-99. Moreover, in the absence of a clear international
statement or applicable treaty resolving the question, "such precedents have a tendency to coalesce into a source oflegitimacy." Id. at 500.
.
244. Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning Commitments and Settlement of Claims by the United States and
Iran with respect to Resolution of the Crisis arising out of the Detention of 52 United
States Nationals in Iran, with Undertakings and Escrow Agreement, Jan. 19, 1981,
T.I.A.S. (entered into force Jan. 19, 1981). Although the Iran-US Claims Tribunal
primarily applies the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States, Treaty of
Amity .. Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, 284 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force June 16, 1957),
lilt is beyond doubt that international law has been the applicable law in cases
where expropriation has been an issue before the Tribunal. ... Nevertheless, as
regards the questions of expropriation ... there is no indication that the Tribunal conceives the Treaty standards to differ from standards of customary internationallaw. Rather, ... the Tribunal has emphasized, for example, that
the Treaty does not add anything to the general rules of international law insofar as concerns the concept of a taking.
Matti Pellonpaa, Compensable Claims Before the Tribunal: Expropriation Claims,
in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LAw OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 186-87 (Richard B. Lillich & Daniel Barstow Magraw eds.,
1997) (citations omitted). See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 273
("[Tlhe Treaty of Amity on the particular issue of what constitutes a taking incorporates the rules of customary intemationallaw. ").
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Tribunal, George Aldrich, described the Tribunal's understanding that, under international law, "[l]iability does not
arise from actions that are nondiscriminatory and are within
the commonly accepted taxation and police powers of states. "245
Numerous other tribunals have reached the same conclusion. 246
International tribunals have seldom, if ever, addressed
whether environmental regulations affecting foreign-owned
property give rise to a right to compensation. However, an examination of cases addressing indirect expropriation claims
arising out of regulations promoting other government interests demonstrates that international law would not support an
expropriation claim arising out of legitimate environmental
regulations.
International tribunals have not agreed on a definitive test
establishing when indirect expropriation gives rise to a right to
compensation. Although these tribunals have not agreed to a
list of factors relevant to the question, they frequently refer to
factors similar to those described by the U.S. Supreme Court.
For example, international tribunals have considered
whether government actions leading to indirect expropriation
are "reasonable."247 In one such case, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tri-

245. George H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The
Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585, 609 (1994)
[hereinafter Aldrich II. See also GEORGE H. ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 217 (1996) (same) [hereinafter ALDRICH Ill.
See, e.g., Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.; Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Assocs., 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 378 (1989).
246. See, e.g., Kugele v. Polish State, 6 Ann. Dig. Int'l L. 69 (1931-a2) (Upper Silesian Arb. Trib. 1930) (series oflicense fees that forced claimant to close brewery did not
constitute compensable taking); Brewer, Moller & Co. Case (Ger. v. Ven.), 10 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 423 (1903) (taxes legally levied and without discrimination cannot be
recovered); Liselotte Hauer v. Land Reinland-Pflaz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727 (considering,
inter alia, "principles of international law," finding no expropriation when EEC regulations prohibited claimant from planting a certain type of grapevine because the regulations promoted the general welfare). See also West v. Multibanco ComElrmex, S.A., 807
F.2d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) ([Ulnder international
law, "[vlalid expropriations must always serve a public purpose; that public purpose in
some cases may be so strong as to render lawful what otherwise might constitute a
'taking'"; rmding no taking because requiring foreign funds to be surrendered in exchange for local (less valuable) fund was a legitimate exercise of the police power.).
247. See supra notes 163-170 and accompanying text.
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bunal considered an expropriation claim arising out of the refusal of a government bank to honor the claimant's checks because of a law establishing certain authentication requirements.248 The Tribunal refused to find an expropriation because it did not find the bank's actions to amount to «unreasonable interference" with the claimant's property. 249 Other
cases have concluded that government regulations were reasonable when they imposed taxes,250 prohibited planting new
grapes to regulate wine production,251 and regulated the production of alcohol through license fees. 252
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, international law requires
something more than a simple governmental declaration that a
particular interference with an alien's enjoyment of his or her

248. Harza Engineering Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.s. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, 504 (1981-82).
Because of its finding, the Tribunal found it unnecessary to determine "how unreasonable the interference must be to constitute a taking of property." [d.
249. [d. at 505. See also Mark Dallal v. Iran, Award No. 53-149-1 (10 June 1983),
reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 10 (refusing compensation for bank's refusal to
honor checks because no indication that banks had acted unreasonably). These decisions follow general international legal practice, which considers financial regulation to
be among the legitimate police powers of government. See Pellonpaa, supra note 244,
at 253 (noting that the Iran-US Claims Tribunal's treatment of cases involving financial regulations "has not been decisively different" from "previous international legal
practice, [in which) exchange control regulations and other restrictions on the transfer
of funds abroad have been accepted to a very significant degree").
250. See Too, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 387 (refusing to require compensation
for government seizure of claimant's liquor license for failure to pay taxes due because
"a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation or any other action that is commonly accepted
as within the police power of States, provided it is not discriminatory and is not designed to cause the alien to abandon the property to the State· or to sell it at a distress
price."); Brewer, Moller & Co., 10 R. Int'! Arb. Awards at 423 (taxes legally levied and
without discrimination cannot be recovered).
251. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3745-49. Although the court in Hauer applied European law, the relevant protection of property rights depends on principles of internationallaw. See id. at 3745 (applying Article I of Protocol to European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights, which protects property rights "subject to the conditions provided for ... by the general principles of intemationallaw").
252. See, e.g., Kugele, 6 Ann. Dig. at 69 (series of license fees that forced claimant to
cloSe brewery did not constitute compensable taking). In Kugele, the tribunal stated
that
there is an essential difference between the maintenance of a certain rate of
profit in an undertaking and the legal and factual possibility of continuing the
undertaking. The trader may feel compelled to close his business because of
the new tax .... But this does not mean that he has lost the right to engage in
the trade.
.
Id. at 69 (citing 3 SCHIDSGERICHT FOR OBERSCHLESIEN at 24).
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property is justified by the so-called 'police power,' "[b]ut, if the
reasons given are valid and bear some plausible relationship to
the action taken, no attempt may be made to search deeper to
see whether the State was activated by some illicit motive."253
Thus, the European Court of Justice considered "whether there
exists a reasonable relationship between the measures provided for by the regulation [a prohibition on planting new
grapes] and the aim pursued by the Community in this case [to
regulate wine production]."254
International decisions also recognize that the severity of
the economic impact caused by an indirect expropriation is
relevant to determining whether compensation is required. 255
International tribunals have refused to require compensation
when the expropriation did not remove all economic value from
the property. As explained by one scholar considering the jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
before measures restricting the rights of owners to use
and dispose of their property will be considered to
amount to expropriation it must be apparent that the
governmental actions have so completely deprived the
owners of their property rights that the rights are rendered nugatory. Such fmdings are more readily made
where the government has the avowed intention of socialising the economy and thereby depriving private
owners of their property rights. * * * [T]he principal
test as to whether actions falling short of a forDlal taking of title constitute a taking is whether or not the action fundamentally restricts the right of the owner to

253. Christie, supra note 240, at 338.
254. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3747.
255. This principle may be a "general principle of law," recognized as a source of international law. See supra note 241. One scholar reviewing "representative" legal
systems concluded that
a comparison of domestic law leaves no doubt that the prohibition of economically optimal use of property in itself may not be equated with an indirect expropriation .... A survey of the relevant domestic laws indicates that [the point
at which the regulation of property assumes the quality of an indirect expropriation] lies where the property in question, after introduction of the measure
concerned, can no longer be put to reasonable economic use.
Dolzer, supra note 236, at 62.
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manage or dispose of the property, or if the property has
been rendered virtually valueless. Governmental actions which limit the owner's right in relation to his
property but which do not significantly affect the aforementioned fundamental rights generally do not amount
to expropriation of the property entitling the owner to
compensation. 256

This principle has been applied by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal to decide an expropriation claim arising out of Iranian
exchange restrictions that prohibited the Iranian Central Bank
from converting claimant's money into a currency that could be
transferred out of the country.257 When the claimant sought
compensation, the Tribunal concluded that Iran had not expropriated the funds, because the "account remain[ed] in existence
and available, in [Iranian currency], at [the claimant's] disposal. n258 Similarly, the Tribunal refused to fmd an expropriation when Iranian law prohibited the exportation of certain
property but the claimant maintained the option to sell the
property in Iran. 259

256. WAYNE MAPP, THE IRAN·US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: THE FIRST 10 YEARS 152, 155
(1993). In Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983),
the Tribunal stated:
.
[I)t is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so
useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the
State does not purpose to have expropriated them and the legal title to the
property formally remains with the original owner.
257. See Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, 6 Cl. Trib. Rep. 149 (1984-II) cited in Pellonpaa, supra note 244, at 253.
25S. Id; at 167 (citing Harza Engineering Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 499, in
which "the Tribunal held that the refusal of [the bank) to honour four cheques drawn
on the Claimant's account could have been motivated by reasons of legitimate banking
practice, and did not constitute an interference with the Claimant's right to deal with
the account as a whole"). The Sea-Land Tribunal found "insufficient evidence that [the
bank) intentionally obstructed the progress of the [transfer) application, or that it
interfered unlawfully in any way with [claimant's) use of its account." Id.
259. Seismographic Service Corp. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 22 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 3, 7S-S1 (19S9-II). See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 275 ("When
an action ... results in an outright transfer of title rather than incidental economic
injury, ... a taking must be presumed to have occurred."). Other international tribunals have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mitzi Schoo, Decision No. CZ-279
(1960), U.S. FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL
REPORT (1961), at ISO (hereinafter FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT).
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Other tribunals have applied similar reasoning. The European Court of Human Rights, interpreting a claim under a
European human rights instrument providing for the right of
"peaceful enjoyment of ... possessions," did not fmd indirect
expropriation to have occurred as a result of land use regulations that affected the claimant's property because,
although the right [of peaceful enjoyment of possessions] lost some of its substance, it did not disappear
The Court observe [s] in this connection that the
[claimants] could continue to utilise their possessions
and that, although it became more difficult to sell properties [as a result of the regulations], the possibility of
selling subsisted. 260
Likewise, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission rejected a compensation claim based on the government's refusal
to grant an export license for the claimant's jewelry. 261
Another component in considering the severity of the· impact
on property is the duration of the regulation causing the im-

As under U.S. law, however, an action that renders the property entirely worthless
may require compensation, even if the action was justifiable. For example, in Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Iran, 10 Iran·U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 121, 129·130, 25 ILM 619, 625 (1986),
the Iran·U.S. Claims Tribunal considered a claim arising out of Iran's replacement of
the managers of the claimant's company with government representatives pursuant to
a regulation designed to prevent the closure of factories, ensure payments due to workers and protect debts owed to the Government. The Tribunal found an expropriation
even though it "fully understloodl" the reasons for the regulations. [d. According to
one member of the Phelps Dodge panel, the Tribunal's award of compensation despite
the arguable legitimacy of the measures at issue ·was doubtless influenced by its perception that the deprivations were likely to be permanent, even when termed 'provisional'" and that the measure gave the government full control over the property. See
Aldrich I, supra note 245, at 590.
260. Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, (1982) Eur. Ct. H. R. Al52 available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECCASE file. See also West v. Multibanco Comermex, SA, 807
F.2d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987) (no taking under international law where legitimate exchange controls reduced value of claimant's funds).
261. Erna Spielberg, Decision No. CZ-2 466 at 146-47 (1961), FOURTEENTH
SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 259, at 146 (refusal to grant export license for jewelry
not a taking). Using analogous reasoning, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal has refused
to require compensation for loss of value of a minority shareholder's interest in a company after the government expropriated the holdings of a majority shareholder because
the minority shares retained value. See, e.g., Ataollah Golpira v. Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 171 (1983).
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pact. Thus, Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal decisions appear to indicate that "[o]ne or two isolated instances of interference ... do
not suffice [for a compensable taking]; proof appears to be required that the blocking is of a more comprehensive nature. "262
Similarly, when the European Court of Justice denied a compensation claim arising out of the grape restriction, it did so in
part because the regulatory action was to be valid for only two
or three years.263
International decisions have also noted that whether the
foreign property owner could reasonably have expected the particular impact on her property is relevant to whether a government regulation gives rise to a right to compensation. For
example, in Starrett Housing v. Iran, for example, the IranU.S. Claims Tribunal refused to find an indirect expropriation
based on the inability of the claimant to complete a construction project due to strikes, work stoppages, the collapse of the
Iranian banking system and other obstacles that were the result of the Iranian revolution. 264 The Tribunal noted that
investors in Iran, like investors in all other countries,
have to assume a risk that the country might experience
strikes, lock-outs, disturbances, changes of the economic
and political system and even revolution. That any of
these risks materialized does not necessarily mean that
property rights affected by such events can be deemed to

262. Pellonpaa, supra note 244, at 252 (describing Harza Engineering case). One
Tribunal member has concluded that
[plrovisional or temporary assumption of control of an alien's property by
State action gives rise to liability whenever the deprivation is not merely
"ephemeral" in the sense that (a) no reasonable prospect exists that control
will be returned; or (b) that any losses that may ensue during the period of
control are not compensable to the property owner; or (c) that the control has
continued for a substantial period of time (perhaps several years) in circumstances where the property owner has not behaved in a manner clearly inconsistent with a claim of deprivation.
ALDRICH II, supra note 245, at 217.
263. Hauer, 1979 E.C.R. at 3749. The US Foreign Claims Settlement Court has
also rejected compensation claims when national administration of property has been
only temporary. See, e.g., Public Law 85-604 Panel Opinion No.6, Part 1, ELEVENTH
SEMIANNUAL REPORT (1959), at 28-29; FOURTEENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT, at 134-35.
264. Starrett Housing Corp., 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. At 156 (1983),23 I.L.M. at
1117.
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have been taken. A revolution as such does not entitle
investors to compensation under international law. 265
The same reasoning applies to the possibility of encountering legitimate government regulations:
[l]t could be argued that the foreign investor entered the
state voluntarily, knowing the risk of ... regulatory laws
being applied against him, and that he should bear the
risk of such adverse changes as any citizen of the state
would. It should not be the function of the international
law to insulate the foreign investor from the regulatory
regime of the host state's laws.266

This discussion demonstrates that international law does
not require compensation for the economic impact of regula. tions that are a legitimate exercise of government police power.
This rule holds particularly true when the regulation leaves
the affected property with some value and is one that could
reasonably be expected given the nature of the regulated activity. Although no international tribunal has yet applied this
rule to environmental regulations, the following discussion will
demonstrate that it applies with particular force in such cases.

265. Id. See also Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran·U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 275 (When property is
forfeited as the result of a crime, no taking has occurred because "the person(s) affected
do not rightfully possess title to the property in question.").
266. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159, at 300. As evidence that this principle is gener·
ally recognized and thus supports an international norm, Professor Dolzer notes that
the various domestic orders uniformly indicate, in principle, that no compen·
sation is due when the measure is necessary in order to protect the public from
a danger arising from the property; the police power in its various forms generally overrides property rights, even though certain defmitional issues have
plagued courts and commentators in this area. When the measure is not
based on the police power and infringes upon existing use, the state normally
will enter into conflict with legitimate ... investment backed expectations
based on property rights!, which) will typically violate the guarantee of private
property in the absence of compensation.
Dolzer, supra note 236, at 62.
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VI. UNDER NAFTA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES ARE A LEGITIMATE
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER THAT SHOULD NOT
NORMALLY GIVE RISE TO A RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
NAFTA does not define what constitutes "expropriation" or
a "measure tantamount to ... expropriation." The terms must
therefore be interpreted consistently with international law
and in light of their context.267 As demonstrated above, it is "an
accepted principle of international law that a State is not liable
for economic injury which is a consequence of bona fide 'regulation' within the accepted police power of states."268 To the best
of my knowledge, however, no international tribunal has yet
considered whether this principle applies to environmental
regulations, although scholars have assumed that it does269 and
the United States claims to agree. 270

267. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc.
AlCONF. 39f27 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), provides that interpretation of a treaty is to
take into account "any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties." The NAFTA parties apparently intended the expropriation pro·
vision to implement international law . In responding to questions from Congress, US
Trade Representative Kantor stated that NAFTA's expropriation provision would mean
that Mexico (and presumably Canada and the United States as well) "will now be gov·
erned by common international law in respect of any nationalizations or expropriations
of foreign investments." North American Free·Trade Agreement (Nalta) And Supple·
mental Agreements To The Nalta: Hearing Before The Committee On Ways And Means
And Its Subcommittee On Trade, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess., (Sept. 14, 15, 21, 23, 1993)
(statement from Micky Kantor, U.S. Trade Representative) (in Arnold & Porter Legis·
lative History: P.L. 103·182 at 90).
268. Sedco, Inc., 9 Iran U.S. Iran Cl. Trib. At 275. See generally supra Part V.
269. See, e.g.. SORNARAJAH, supra note 159.
270. Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Mfairs Alan P. Larson noted the concern that, in its current form, the expropriation provision of the MAl, which is substantially similar to that of NAFT A,
could be misinterpreted to go beyond international (and U.S. "takings") law.
There is consensus among negotiators that any ambiguity on this point must
be eliminated. Normal regulatory actions, even when they affect the value of an
investment, should not be considered as an expropriation requiring compensation. .. . There is emerging consensus that the MAl must include meaningful
commitments on both labor and environment. We all agree that the MAl must
not and will not undermine the ability of governments to regulate for protection of health, safety and the environment.
Larson, supra note 88, at 51 (in light of the ongoing MAl negotiations, the article was
not to "be construed as providing formal or final administration positions on specific
outstanding issues"). In testimony before Congress, Larson reiterated that
the U.S. delegation has argued that the provision of this proposed agreement
simply cannot interfere with normal, non-discriminatory regulatory activities
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A review of the international cases described above shows
that environmental regulations should be among those legitimate regulations that do not normally give rise to an obligation
to compensate for devaluation of property. International tribunals have recognized a range of government regulations as
legitimate exercise of the police power that do not require compensation. These include tax regulations, regulations governing the transfer and exchange of currency, licensing fees for the
production of alcoholic beverages, restrictions to protect wine
production, and export restrictions. 271 Given the undeniable
impact of human activities on environmental health, and the
equally obvious relationship between environmental health
and human welfare, it is clear that regulations to protect the
environment are at least as legitimate as regulations to address any of these other governmental concerns.
Furthermore, the nature of environmental protection indicates that environmental regulations should be accorded particular protection from compensation claims. Such regulations
are an important method of internalizing environmental costs,
which is an essential component of environmental protection
and "a general principle ofinternationallaw."272 As the OEeD
has explained, internalizing environmental costs depends in
large part on requiring the polluter to "bear the expenses of
carrying out [pollution prevention) measures decided by public
authorities to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable
state. "273 Requiring the government to provide compensation
for the economic impact of environmental regulations does exactly the opposite, shifting the cost of complying with environmental measures, and thereby the cost of environmental harm,
onto the general public. Such a shift constitutes a significant
obstacle to environmental protection. For these reasons, the

in such areas as health, safety and the environment. In particular, we want to
ensure that the expropriation article of the MAl cannot be used inappropri·
ately to challenge regulatory decisions.
Larson Testimony, supra note 15.
271. See supra notes 250-258.
272. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, Nov. 30, 1990, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 733,735-736. See generally supra notes 11-12
and accompanying text.
273. OECD Guiding Principles, supra note 11, at par. 4.
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polluter pays principle and the multitude of international
agreements for the protection of the environment require that
governments generally be free to implement environmental
regulations without having to pay to do so.
Environmental measures also have special legitimacy in the
NAFTA regime. Under international law, treaty provisions are
to be interpreted in light of their context. 274 The context of the
NAFTA expropriation provisions includes the strong emphasis
that both NAFTA and NAAEC give to environmental protection. Both agreements strongly promote preserving the right of
each government to protect the environment, ensuring that
governments maintain and enforce environmental measures,
and facilitating the strengthening of laws and regulations to
protect the environment. 275 In the context ofNAFTA, therefore,
environmental measures are legitimate and the expropriation
provision should not be interpreted to interfere with the ability
of governments to implement such measures.
In addition, NAFTA's investment provisions themselves
specifically address environmental protection. Those provisions discourage countries from waiving or derogating from
environmental measures to attract or retain foreign investment,276 and protect the right of each government to adopt,
maintain or enforce measures that it considers "appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in
a manner sensitive to environmental concerns. "277 Requiring
compensation for the economic impact of environmental regulations conflicts with these provisions by making it costly for governments to enforce or strengthen existing environmental
measures or to adopt new ones.

274. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 267,
art. 31, the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted "in their context," which includes
"any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in con·
nexion with the conclusion of the treaty." The NAAEC thus constitutes part of the
context in which NAFTA terms are to be interpreted. If a global investment agreement
were to be based on the MAl Negotiating Text, the same context of environmental
protection would apply there. See supra notes 66·68 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 241-266 and accompanying text.
276. NAFTA, supra note 25, art. 1114.2.
277. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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For all these reasons, there can be no doubt that environmental regulations are a legitimate exercise of governmental
power that should not normally give rise to a government obligation to compensate for resulting economic losses. Moreover,
to require compensation would be inconsistent with generally
accepted intern~tional law concerning environmental protection, as well as with NAFTA's particular concern that its provisions not interfere with the ability of governments to protect
the environment.
Ethyl Corporation's expropriation claim raised a different
legitimacy issue. Ethyl based its claim in part on an argument
that Canada's ban was not really an environmental measure.
Ethyl argued that "[t]he lack of any clear scientific evidence
throws into doubt whether [the Canadian MM:T measure] is
necessary to protect human life or health, "278 and claimed that
the measure was unjustified "since there is no consensus of scientific opinion on the effects of MMT. "279 Similar arguments
may be expected in support of other NAFTA expropriation
claims. Such challenges to the scientific basis for an environmental measure raise important issues that directly affect the
right and ability of governments to protect against the risk of
environmental harm.
When a government promotes a measure as protecting
against a risk to the environment, it is reasonable to require
that the risk be real, not simply a disguise for a measure intended to achieve another purpose such as expropriation or
protecting domestic production. This is the scheme established
by the general exceptions to NAFTA and GATr,280 which recognizes that certain concerns are important enough to justify in-

278. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14. Ethyl based its claim in large
part on its characterization of the Canadian ban as a performance requirement. See
supra note 111 and accompanying text. Although it is beyond the scope of this article
to analyze this characterization, that argument appears to strain the language of the
performance requirement provision. Ethyl's claim may have been motivated by a desire to avoid the general exceptions to the NAFTA, which permit measures "related to"
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, by applying the exceptions to the
performance requirement provision, which limit the exception to measures "necessary
for" such conservation. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
279. Notice of Arbitration, supra note 107, at 14.
280. See supra note 50.
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terfering with the free flow of trade, as long as they are not
really a disguise for measures intended to achieve illegitimate
goals, such as protecting domestic industry. To distinguish
between legitimate environmental measures and disguised illegitimate measures, it is reasonable to require that the existence of the risk to the environment be scientifically supported.
It is essential, however, that the need for scientific support not
become a requirement that the government demonstrate that
its measure is supported by "most," "best" or "most widely accepted" scientific evidence. Such a requirement is contrary to
the precautionary principle and inconsistent with the nature of
science. More importantly, it would seriously interfere with
the ability of governments to protect against risks of environmental harm.
Any regime that truly allows for protection against the risk
of environmental harm must recognize the precautionary principle, which is based on the premise that science does not always provide the information or insights necessary to take protective action effectively or in a timely manner, and that undesirable and potentially irreversible effects may result if action
is not taken until science does provide such insights. 281 Pursu-

281. The precautionary principle is included in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is explicitly reaffirmed in NAFTA's preamble. NAFTA,
supra note 25, at 297. The Rio Declaration provides the following definition of the
principle:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation.
Rio Declaration, supra note 12, princ. 15. Other agreements recognizing the principle
include the Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, pmbl., 30 I.L.M. 818; the
Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. AJAC.237/18 (Part II)/Add.l
(1992),31 I.L.M. 849 ("The Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures"); the Ministerial
Declaration of the Second World Climate Conference, Nov. 7, 1990, 1 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL.
L. 473 (1990) (ministers and representatives of 137 countries agree to "protect the
ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control ... emission of substances that
deplete it"); the Second International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,
Ministerial Declaration 1 (1987) (ministers of the EEC and eight countries agree that
the North Sea ecosystem should be protected through the reduction of pollution "even
where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and
effects ('the principle of precautionary action')"); and the World Charter for Nature,
G.A. Res. 37n, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. AJRes/37n (1982), 22
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ant to this principle, coWltries have the right to regulate activities that may be harmful to the environment even if the scientific evidence concerning the connection between the activity
and the harm is inadequate or inconclusive-that is, even if
scientists do not agree or cannot explain exactly whether, how
or to what degree the harm is caused. 282 This principle has
been part of domestic and international law for several decades
and has become a "broadly accepted basis for international action.'>283
The precautionary principle does not ignore science or remove scientific inquiry from the effort to identify legitimate
governmental measures. However, the principle reflects a rec-

I.L.M. 455 (1983) ("Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall
be preceded by an exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that
expected benefits outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential adverse
effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed."). See also E. Hey,
The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 308-09 (1992).
282. In understanding the importance of the precautionary principle, it is helpful to
remember that the fact that scientific evidence is not conclusive does not mean that it
is not probative. For example, human health regulations have long been based on
studies exposing animals to high doses of potentially harmful substances, even when
there was no conclusive evidence that the regulated substances cause the same harm
in humans that they do in animals. These regulations are based on the reasonable
assumption that effects on animals are probative evidence-not conclusive proof-of
potential effects in humans. See NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, EVERYTHING DOESN'T
CAUSE CANCER (NIH Pub. No. 90-2039, March, 1990) ("Of the several hundred ...
chemicals that cause cancer in animals, however, it is not known how many are also
human carcinogens. Nevertheless, materials that cause cancer in one type of animal
usually are found to cause cancer in others.... For these and other reasons, we should
expect animal carcinogens to be capable of causing cancer in humans."). Likewise,
studies showing harm at high doses are at least evidence of the possibility of-or potential for-harm at low doses. Although they may not prove that harm will occur,
they support the conclusion that there is a risk.
283. Philippe Sands, The Greening of International Law: Emerging Principles and
Rules, 1 GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES J. 293, 301 (1994). See also PHILIPPE SANDS,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 208-12 (1995) (precautionary
principle has received widespread support; a "good argument" can be made that it
reflects customary international law); INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
262 (Tim O'Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994). In his dissenting opinion in the 1995
French nuclear testing case, Judge Weeramantry of the International Court of Justice
noted the importance of the precautionary principle in light of the irreversibility of some
environmental damage and stated that the precautionary principle is gaining increasing
support as part of the international law of the environment. Request for an Examination
of the Situation in Accordance With Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgment of 20 December
1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, 1995 ICJ Reports 288, 342
(Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
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ognition that scientific certainty is rare and that advancements
in scientific knowledge-including knowledge of previously unknown risks-nearly always begin as controversial theories
held by a minority of the scientific community. If governments
must base environmental measures on the scientific conclusions accepted as "best" by the majority of scientists or supported by the '\veight" of available scientific evidence, they will
be unable to take precautionary measures to protect against
risks suggested by new, and frequently controversial, evidence.
The NAAEC recognizes the right of each Party "to establish
its own levels of domestic [environmental] protection"284 and
the importance of achieving "enhanced levels of environmental
protection. "285 Determining the appropriate level of protection
in the face of a given risk is a fundamentally political decision
that only a government that is accountable to those affected by
the decision can make legitimately. When a nation identifies a
potential risk to health or the environment, it must decide
whether and to what extent to take steps to protect against
that risk. While science plays an important role in identifying
the existence of a risk, the decision concerning the appropriate
response to that risk also requires political decisions such as
weighing how much the citizens of the country (ear the particular risk and how much, if at all, they value the benefits that
the risky activity provides. This balancing of potentially competing concerns goes to the heart of what governments do determine appropriate actions based on the fears and values of
citizens.
Similarly, the ability to enhance environmental protection is
meaningless unless governments are permitted a full range of
responses to legitimate environmental risks. Such responses
must include the right to impose stricter standards to prevent
harm that is certain to occur, as well as the right to implement

284. NAAEC, supra note 51, art. 3.
285. [d. pmbl.
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measures to protect against possible risks revealed by new or
controversial scientific evidence. 286
For these reasons, governments implementing an environmental measure must retain the ability to make judgments
concerning conflicting evidence or different scientific principles,
as well as how and when to respond to a legitimate environmental risk. It is therefore inappropriate for an outside body
that is not accountable to a country's residents, such as an arbitral tribunal, to attempt to weigh competing scientific claims
to determine whether there is "enough" risk to justify the
measure in question, or whether the measure is supported by
the "correct" or "best" or "most accepted" science.
In light of these considerations, therefore, an arbitral tribunal considering an expropriation claim arising out of a purported environmental measure should limit its inquiry to determining whether the science underlying the risk determination has the minimal attributes of scientific inquiry - that is,
whether the evidence of risk has been derived through the application of legitimate scientific methods and procedures, and is
probative of a potential for adverse effects. 287 This is true even
if the evidence is controversial or inconclusive. Once an arbitral tribunal has confirmed that the evidence is scientific and

286. This point can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose two people
are preparing to leave their homes to go to the office in the morning and each checks
several weather forecasts before doing so to determine whether to take precautions
against getting wet from rain. Assume further that these people are seeking to achieve
different levels of protection: one is willing to Buffer a little wetness but would prefer
not to get extremely wet; the other considers it extremely important to avoid getting
wet (i.e .• has chosen a higher level of protection). Four out of five forecasts indicate
that it is most likely not going to rain during the day. but the fifth. using a new and
controversial forecasting method. indicates that it is likely to rain. The person who is
willing to get a little wet is likely to take fewer precautions against rain on the chance
that the new forecasting method is not as reliable as the method used by the other four
forecasts. The person with the higher level of protection is more likely to consider the
possibility that the new method may be accurate and take precautions against rain.
Forcing the second person to act on the basis of the majority of the evidence effectively
lowers the level of protection that she is permitted to choose.
That is not to say. however. that science has no role in this scenario. To be a legitimate basis for protective measures. the new forecasting method must be based on a
minimally scientific inquiry concerning the weather. instead of on unscientific methods. such as astrological predictions.
287. This is an appropriate role for the expert assistance NAFTA makes available
to arbitral tribunals. NAFTA. supra note 25. art. 1133.
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probative, it should accept the legitimate environmental basis
for the measure. Such an analysis will ensure that environmental measures are not disguised expropriations or protectionist measures without interfering with the ability of governments to take precautionary measures or their right to apply the political judgments inherent in setting their appropriate levels of protection against risk. 288
The SD Myers claim. raises a different issue concerning the
legitimacy of environmental measures. The Canadian PCB
export ban was based on Canada's obligations under the Basel
Convention.289 The Basel Convention forms part of the internationallaw that applies in interpreting NAFTA's expropriation
provisions. 290 Environmental measures addressing risks recognized in a widely adopted international agreement shall be
presumed to be legitimate and should not normally give rise to
an obligation to compensate for their economic impact on investment. Moreover, requiring governments to pay compensation to implement such measures interferes with efforts to address global environmental problems through international
consensus.
International law thus recognizes the right of governments

to regulate to promote legitimate governmental objectives

288. These principles would support the right of the governments of Canada and
Mexico to maintain the measures at issue in the Ethyl and Metalclad cases. Scientific
studies have apparently shown that airborne manganese poses a risk to human health.
See supra notes 109 and 133. If these studies are the result of the application of legitimate scientific methods, they should be sufficient to support the environmental
legitimacy of Canada's ban. Likewise, the study indicating that operation of Metal- .
clad's waste facility poses a risk to human health and the environment (again assuming that the study is legitimately scientific) weighs against Metalclad's compensation
claim. Even the existence of scientific studies to the contrary should not prohibit the
government from taking precautionary measures to protect these serious interests.
289. See supra notes 142-144.
290. Article 104 of NAFTA provides that the obligations of several inteinational
environmental agreements are to prevail over any inconsistent obligations in NAFTA.
These agreements are the Basel Convention; the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES); the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer; the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government
of the United States Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste;
and the Agreement Between the United States and Mexico on Cooperation for the
protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. NAFTA, supra
note 25, art. 104.
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without incurring an obligation to provide compensation for
every impact of those regulations on the value of property. 291
The discussion of international law in Section V also indicates
that international tribunals have recognized additional factors
that support governments' right to regulate without having to
provide compensation.
The most important such factor is the degree to which the
regulation affects the value of the investment.292 . As noted
above, international law considers an indirect expropriation to
require compensation if it renders property "virtually valueless."293 In other words, as Ethyl explained in its NAFTA claim,
international law requires compensation ''where the effect [of
the regulation] is similar to what might have occurred under
an outright expropriation."294 Thus, a regulation is not "tantamount to expropriation" if it leaves some value in the investment in question. 295

291. See supra Part v.
292. See supra notes 255 . 263 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. This criterion is supported by the
statement of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal quoted by Ethyl in its Notice of Arbitration:
"[Mleasures taken by a State can interfere with property rights to such 1m extent that
these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated:" Notice of Arbitrations, supra note 107, at 10 (quoting Starrett Housing Corp., 4
Iran-US Cl. Trib. Rep. at 154) (emphasis added».
294. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
295. This factor is relevant to the claims of both Metalclad and Ethyl. It does not
appear that Metalclad is asserting that the government actually took its property, but
rather that the refusal of the operating permit and the environmental zoning regulation affected the economic value of the waste treatment facility. Likewise, Ethyl admits that the sale of MMT constitutes only half the revenue of Ethyl Canada. See
supra note 112. Canada's law thus did not deprive Ethyl of all economic benefit of its
investment. Therefore, even under Ethyl's own interpretation of international law,
Ethyl's claim was unsupported.
Ethyl attempted to strengthen its claim by arguing that the loss of 50% of its revenues would cause the parent corporation to reevaluate whether to continue operations
in Canada. See supra note 113. International tribunals have long recognized that this
fact is completely irrelevant to the compensation determination. See, e.g., Kugele, 6
Ann. Dig. At 69. Ethyl also padded its claim with allegations of negative effects on its
"worldwide sales." This approach hugely multiplies the disincentive to achieving the
goals of strengthening environmental protection. Claims like Ethyl's would make
governments unwilling ever to take measures to protect against newly-identified risks,
because to do so would make them potentially liable for harm to sales and reputation
in any country that has not already implemented measures. This is clearly inconsistent with the goals of NAFTA to maintain and strengthen environmentally protective
measures. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
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Another factor that is relevant under international law is
whether regulations affecting the investment were
foreseeable. 296 This factor weighs against requiring compensation in the case of most environmental laws, including those at
issue in the NAFTA cases described above.297 Harm to the environment is universally recognized as an extremely serious
issue and, as such, is a common subject of government regulation. NAFTA's emphasis on maintaining and strengthening
environmental protection gives notice of the three governments' intention to implement environmental measures. It can
hardly be considered a surprise when they do so.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The NAFTA claims described in this Article demonstrate
the need for clarification of the NAFTA expropriation provision
as it applies to environmental measures. International law has
long supported the right of governments to implement legitimate measures in the exercise of their police powers without
incurring an obligation to compensate if such measures diminish the value of foreign investments. General principles of environmentallaw and protection, as well as the specific emphasis that NAFTA places on environmental protection, make
clear that this right applies with particular force with respect
to legitimate regulations protecting the environment. For
these reasons, the parties to NAFTA and negotiators of other
regional or global investment agreements should make explicitly clear that protection against expropriation does not include
a right to compensation for diminished value resulting from the
effects of legitimate environmental regulations.

296. See supra notes 264-266 and accompanying text.
297. When Metalclad undertook to upgrade and operate the hazardous waste facil~
ity, it was well aware that its activities were subject to regulation. In addition to being
aware that its activities were subject to regulation in Mexico, see supra note 93 and
accompanying text, Metalclad should have been aware that similar activities are
regulated in the United States. Nor can Ethyl claim surprise that the government
promulgated new regulations concerning the production and sale of gasoline additives,
because these activities have long been the subject of government regulation, both in
Canada and the United States. The long-standing laws regulating PCB use and disposal in both the United States and Canada, as well as the existence of the Basel Convention, gave SD Myers ample notice that its activities were subject to regulation.
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To truly enable governments to protect the environment, it
is essential to make explicit the following points:
•

Legitimate environmental measures do not create a
right to compensation for any decrease in the value
of a foreign investment affected by the measures

•

Legitimate environmental measures include measures implemented pursuant to the precautionary
principle

•

Governments must have the right to establish their
own level of protection against risks of environmental harm

•

Any test of the legitimacy of environmental measures must not require the government to prove that
a risk of harm is supported by the ''best,'' "most" or
"most widely accepted" science; it is sufficient if the
application of legitimate scientjfic methods and procedures demonstrates a potential for adverse environmental effects.

Creating a right to compensation for an environmental law's
economic impacts on foreign investors would severely chill the
ability of governments to protect the environment. Such a regime would be akin to a legally enforced protection racket-the
government would be forced to pay those who would harm the
environment to stop or limit their harmful activities.
Fortunately, international law does not support such a
scheme. Rather, it recognizes that legitimate governmental
regulations do not normally give rise to a right to compensation, and that environmental protection is an important subject
of government action, even when foreign investors must bear
an economic burden as a result of that action. It is crucial that
governments J'legotiating new trade or investment agreements
recognize these principles and explicitly ensure that such
agreements do not create new obstacles to the ability of governments to protect the environment through legitimate environmentallaws and regulations.
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